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G E T T I N G T O E Q U A L : R E S O L V I N G T H E
J U D I C I A L I M P A S S E O N T H E W E I G H T O F N O N -
M O N E T A R Y C O N T R I B U T I O N I N K E N Y A ’ S
M A R I T A L A S S E T D I V I S I O N
Benedeta Prudence Mutiso*
Abstract
Marital property law reforms and changing international 
human rights standards in the late 20th and early 21st century 
prompted Kenya to end certain discriminatory practices against
women, especially in the area of property rights. For 50 years, 
Kenya relied on England’s century-old law, the Married Wom-
en’s Property Act of 1882, to regulate property rights. In 2010, 
Kenya adopted a new Constitution that called for equality be-
tween men and women, and in 2013, Kenya enacted independ-
ent legislation in the form of the Matrimonial Property Act 
(MPA). The MPA provides a basis for trial courts to divide mar-
ital property upon divorce. Specifically, it provides that monetary 
contribution and non-monetary contribution are the only factors
for dividing marital property on divorce. The Kenyan courts 
have issued contradictory decisions on the weight of non-
monetary contribution in long-term and short-term marriages. 
Without guidance on the weight of non-monetary contribution 
during divorce proceedings, the courts have left potential liti-
gants, especially women, to navigate the unsettled waters of 
marital disputes in the legal system. Kenya’s Parliament should 
take steps to clarify the legislation, develop regulations on the 
weight of non-monetary contribution, and provide statutory fac-
tors for consideration during division of marital property. This 
will ensure that courts meet the overriding objective of achieving 
a fair outcome in marital property disputes. Because of the con-
stitutional guarantee of equality, the courts must begin analysis 
of property division by assuming each spouse is entitled to half of
the marital property.
* The author serves as an Attorney at the International Justice Mission-Kenya and 
earned an LL.B from Moi University and an LL.M from Georgetown University Law 
Center. The author is also a Leadership and Advocacy for Women in Africa (LAWA) 
Fellow, 2017–18.
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Introduction
Historically, many societies, including Kenyan society, have ex-
ploited and undervalued women’s uncompensated domestic work.1
Domestic work amounts to a significant amount of time, energy, and 
skill.2 Unfortunately, courts in Kenya have exacerbated, rather than con-
fronted, this inequity. The courts have not equalized the weight of un-
compensated domestic work and monetary contribution during the di-
vision of marital3 assets.4 Without a proper scheme to account for 
domestic work’s added value to the marital unit, a homemaker spouse, 
typically a woman, faces an uncertain future with severe economic hard-
ships upon divorce.5
After gaining independence from Britain in 1963, Kenya attempt-
ed to restructure its legal system to reflect the shifting social structure.6
The 1963 Constitution of Kenya solidified major barriers to women’s 
equality, including prejudicial practices in marriage, property rights, in-
heritance, and limited socio-economic rights.7 Post-independence, Ken-
ya ratified major international treaties, compelling the country to elimi-
nate discriminatory practices in the administration of property rights for 
women.8
1. Michelle Chen, All Work and No Pay: Recognizing Women’s Unpaid Labor in the 




3. Throughout the piece, I use the terms “marital” and “matrimonial” interchangeably, 
except when referring to specific statutes and definitions.
4. See M.A.A. v. A.R. (2018) Matrimonial Cause No. 1 of 2017, e.K.L.R (H.C.K.) 
(Kenya); F.S. v. E.Z. (2016) Matrimonial Cause No. 16 of 2014, e.K.L.R. (H.C.K.) 
(Kenya); U.M.M. v. I.M.M. (2014) Civil Suit No. 39 of 2012, e.K.L.R. (H.C.K.) 
(Kenya). The court has stated that the law deprives spouses of the right to family 
property if they are unable to prove monetary or non-monetary contribution towards 
acquisition.
5. Deborah J. Morris, “Breaking Up Is Hard to Do”: Proposing Legislative Action in Order 
to Address the Problems Surrounding Alimony and Related Divorce Matters in South Da-
kota, 61 S.D. L. REV. 81, 107 (2016).
6. See generally CONSTITUTION (1963) (Kenya) (repealed 2010).
7. See generally CONSTITUTION art. 14–28 (1963) (Kenya) (repealed 2010).
8. Ruth A. Odhiambo & Maurice Oduor, Gender Equality, in THE CONSTITUTION OF 
KENYA: CONTEMPORARY READINGS 99, 113–14 (Morris K. Mbondenyi, Patrick L. 
O. Lumumba & Steve O. Odero eds., 2011).
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For 50 years, Kenya also relied on the Married Women’s Property 
Act of 1882 (“MWPA”) as the primary legislation on marital property.9
From 1967 to 2013, the country made three unsuccessful attempts to 
pass explicit laws to govern marital property.10 In the absence of a Ken-
yan law on division of marital property, the international human rights 
instruments that Kenya ratified provided a source of law to aid the 
courts in decision-making.11 Because of Kenya’s unrushed pace in im-
plementation of human rights, these treaties did not guarantee married 
women equal protection before the law.12
During this time, the law did not recognize the equality of spouses 
in marriage, disregarding women’s rights in this area.13 Women had lim-
ited rights, especially when laying claim to marital property or inher-
itance, once married.14 This was due partly to local customs and practic-
es that denied women ownership or control of property.15
9. Kenya gained independence in 1963 and relied on the MWPA until Kenya enacted 
the self-governing Matrimonial Property Act in December 2013, which became oper-
ational in January 2014. See Abiud Ochieng, How Courts Have Resolved Matrimonial 
Disputes, DAILY NATION (Feb. 9, 2018), https://www.nation.co.ke/news/How-
courts-have-resolved-matrimonial-disputes/1056-4298810-a63n42z/index.html; see 
also Married Women’s Property Act (1882) (Kenya), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/
ukpga/1882/75/pdfs/ukpga_18820075_en.pdf for the MWPA’s text; and Matrimo-
nial Property Act, No. 49 (2013) (Kenya) for the Matrimonial Property Act’s text.
10. Eugene Cotran, Marriage, Divorce and Succession Laws in Kenya: Is Integration or Uni-
fication Possible?, 40 J. AFR. L. 194, 202 (1996) (describing futile efforts to reform 
women’s rights regarding marriage and divorce in Kenya); Nancy Baraza, Family Law
Reforms in Kenya: An Overview (Apr. 30, 2009) (Presentation at Heinrich Böll 
Foundation’s Gender Forum in Nairobi) (paper on file with the University of Nairo-
bi Research Archives) (“In the case of laws relating to marriage and divorce, three at-
tempts were made to pass the Bill drafted by the Commission was defeated by par-
liament. On all these attempts, the main grounds for failure to enact the law were 
that it was purportedly an assault on local customs or had granted too many rights to 
women . . . . To date the laws relating to marriage and divorce, matrimonial property 
remain unlegislated.”).
11. Echaria v. Echaria (2007) Civil Case 663 of 2007, e.K.L.R (H.C.K.) (Kenya).
12. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DOUBLE STANDARDS: WOMEN’S PROPERTY 
RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN KENYA 1, 16 (2003), http://hrw.org/reports/2003/
kenya0303/kenya0303.pdf.




15. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 12, at 29. For women who could not afford le-
gal counsel, customary law practices within each ethnic group deprived them of the 
right to property, regardless of contribution. In addition, society viewed womens’ un-
compensated domestic work as part of their marital obligation rather than “real 
work.” As a result, during division of marital property after divorce, women lost 
properties and experienced severe economic hardships. See, e.g., Rono v. Rono (2005)
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In part because of persistent discriminatory practices against wom-
en and girls and a repressive regime,16 Kenyans advocated for change. In 
2010, a new Constitution was passed.17 For the first time, the Constitu-
tion expanded the Bill of Rights to include provisions on economic, so-
cial, and cultural rights and the recognition of gender equality.18
The 2010 Constitution provided redress from harmful and 
discriminatory cultural practices and ensured equal protection of 
women before the law.19 In interpreting Article 45 of the Constitution,
which states that, “[p]arties to a marriage are entitled to equal rights at 
the time of the marriage, during the marriage[,] and at the dissolution of 
the marriage,”20 various courts determined that the Constitution 
provides for a 50-50 equitable division of property, while others have 
rejected this approach.21 However, as courts apply the legal principles 
Civil Appeal 66 of 2002, e.K.L.R. (C.A.K.) (Kenya) (relying on the tradition of a 
sub-tribe of the Kalenjin community, brothers made attempts to deny their sisters an 
equal share of property because, according to customs and practices, married women 
could not inherit property).
16. Henry Makori, MAKORI: Remembering Moi the Despot, STAR (Oct. 13, 2018), 
https://www.the-star.co.ke/news/2018/10/13/makori-remembering-moi-the-despot_
c1833949.
17. James Macharia & George Obulutsa, Kenya Votes “Yes” to New Constitution, REUTERS
(Aug. 5, 2010), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-kenya-referendum/kenya-votes-
yes-to-new-constitution-idUSTRE6743G720100805.
18. Id.
19. See, e.g., CONSTITUTION art. 27 § 3 (2010) (Kenya) (“Women and men have the 
right to equal treatment, including the right to equal opportunities in political, eco-
nomic, cultural and social spheres.”); see generally CONSTITUTION art. 2 § 4 (2010) 
(Kenya) (“Any law, including customary law, that is inconsistent with this Constitu-
tion is void to the extent of the inconsistency, and any act or omission in contraven-
tion of this Constitution is invalid.”).
20. CONSTITUTION art. 45 (2010) (Kenya).
21. For cases supporting spousal equality, see, for example, C.M.N. v. A.W.M. (2013) 
Envtl. & Land Case 208 of 2012, e.K.L.R. (H.C.K.) (Kenya) (upholding principle of 
equality in marriage under Art. 45 (3) of the Constitution, which provides: “Parties 
to a marriage are entitled to equal rights at the time of the marriage, during the mar-
riage and at the dissolution of the marriage.”); M.B.O. v. J.O.O. (2018) Civil Appeal 
No. 81 of 2017, e.K.L.R. (C.A.K.) (Kenya) (holding that the wife’s uncompensated 
domestic work and monetary contribution entitled her to half the marital property); 
M.W.G. v. T.K.G. (2016) Civil Case No. 15 of 2014, e.K.L.R. (H.C.K.) (Kenya) 
(holding that the wife’s uncompensated domestic work equaled the husband’s mone-
tary contribution, and awarding her half the marital estate). For cases overlooking 
spousal equality, see, for example, A.W.N. v. F.M.N. (2018) Matrimonial Case No. 
10 of 2016, e.K.L.R. (H.C.K.) (Kenya) (declining to value the wife’s uncompensated 
domestic work in a marriage of fourteen years because the wife did not show the ef-
forts made to acquire the property); M.G.N.K. v. A.M.G. (2016) Civil Appeal No. 
280 of 2012, e.K.L.R. (C.A.K.) (Kenya) (rejecting the principle of equality on divi-
sion of matrimonial property); P.A.W.M. v. C.W.A.M. (2018) Civil Appeal No. 104 
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from the Constitution, women still face violations of their rights,22
including less access to education and employment because of the 
burden of uncompensated domestic work.
In Kenya, uncompensated domestic work and unpaid care work 
constitute the major types of non-monetary work.23 The responsibility 
of unpaid work falls primarily upon women and “contributes to persis-
tent gender inequalities.”24 Women’s responsibility to bear, raise, and 
care for children leads to violations of their basic human rights to educa-
tion, political participation, decent work, and leisure.25 While unpaid 
work is essential to the economy, the responsibility of unpaid work falls 
on women because of their role as mothers, wives, and daughters.26 Sta-
tistics show that only 36.5 percent of women in Kenya work in the for-
mal sector, leaving the majority of women unemployed and doing un-
paid work.27
In 2013, Parliament enacted the Matrimonial Property Act
(“MPA”) as a result of the 2010 Constitution’s instruction to regulate 
matrimonial property on divorce.28 The MPA recognizes both monetary 
and non-monetary contribution of spouses in the acquisition of marital
property.29 It defines “contribution” to mean monetary and non-
monetary contribution, that is, both paid and unpaid work.30 The MPA 
of 2016, e.K.L.R. (C.A.K.) (Kenya) (holding that the husband contributed the 
monetary contribution and therefore deserved the bigger share of the $600,000, and 
awarding the wife only $30,000 for her non-monetary contribution).
22. See, e.g., DEBORAH BUDLENDER & RACHEL MOUSSIÉ, ACTIONAID, MAKING CARE 
VISIBLE: WOMEN’S UNPAID CARE WORK IN NEPAL, NIGERIA, UGANDA AND KENYA
(2014), http://www.actionaid.org/sites/files/actionaid/making_care_visible.pdf.




27. KENYA NAT’L BUREAU OF STATISTICS, ECONOMIC SURVEY 43 (2018), 
http://www.knbs.or.ke/download/economic-survey-2018/.
28. See CONSTITUTION art. 68 (2010) (Kenya) (“Parliament shall— . . . (c) enact legisla-
tion . . . (iii) to regulate the recognition and protection of matrimonial property and 
in particular the matrimonial home during and on the termination of marriage”); see 
generally Matrimonial Property Act, No. 49 (2013) (Kenya).
29. The Matrimonial Property Act, No. 49 § 2.
30. The Matrimonial Property Act, No. 49 § 2. Despite the clear provisions, the courts 
have not changed their rulings or judgments. For example, in the case of F.S. v. E.Z.
(2016), Matrimonial Cause No. 16 of 2014, e.K.L.R. (H.C.K.) (Kenya), in dividing 
three matrimonial properties, the court rejected the equality of spousal contribution. 
The court stated, “[S]ince the husband made monetary contribution, he is entitled to 
the bulk of the property while the wife gets a lesser share since she made non-
monetary contribution.” F.S., Matrimonial Cause No. 16 of 2014. Further, in 
P.A.W.M. v. C.W.A.M. (2018) Civil Appeal No. 104 of 2016, e.K.L.R. (C.A.K.) 
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defines non-monetary contribution as child care, running of family 
business and farm, and performing general household duties.31 Howev-
er, the statute is not clear how much unpaid work should matter in de-
termining settlements of marital property on divorce, or whether it 
should be considered equal to paid work. As a result, courts have con-
tinued to argue that the bulk of the property belongs to the spouse who 
has made monetary contributions and has proof of such contributions.32
This Article argues that, because courts have not adequately ac-
counted for the weight of uncompensated domestic work, contrary to 
the 2010 Constitution’s statement that women are equal during and at 
the dissolution of marriage, Kenya’s Parliament should take steps to 
clarify the legislation and develop regulations regarding the weight of 
non-monetary contribution. Specifically, Parliament should provide 
statutory factors for consideration during division of marital property.
In a marriage constitutionally recognized as a partnership, a court 
should not return to the old idea that the wage earner is entitled to 
most, if not all, of the benefits of household wealth.33
Section I of this Article will discuss background on Kenya. Section 
II will then examine key theories in marriage and property division. 
Section III will discuss the evolution of marital property statutes in 
Kenya. Section IV will then analyze judicial decision-making under 
Kenya’s marital property regime and explore the gaps between law and 
practice in valuing the weight of uncompensated domestic work in 
property division. Section V will discuss guides for reform from other 
countries. Finally, Section VI will make proposals for legislative action 
to address marital disputes through added regulations. This will make 
the law more enforceable and will achieve fair divorce outcomes.
(Kenya), the court rejected the equality of spousal contribution in a marriage of ten 
years and awarded the wife $30,000 for a property valued at over $600,000, with the 
large portion going to the husband.
31. The Matrimonial Property Act, No. 49 § 2.
32. Id.; see, e.g., A.W.N. v. F.M.N. (2018) Matrimonial Cause No. 10 of 2016, e.K.L.R. 
(H.C.K.) (Kenya), (holding that after a 14-year marriage, the woman had no right to 
matrimonial property: “She does not show her involvement in domestic work and 
management of the matrimonial home. Neither has she given evidence of the com-
panionship she gave to the defendant. There is no evidence of her involvement in 
management of family business or property.”); M.A.A. v. A.R. (2018) Matrimonial 
Case No. 1 of 2017, e.K.L.R. (H.C.K.) (Kenya) (stating that after a 36-year marriage, 
it was difficult to estimate the efforts by the spouse who did not make any financial 
contribution and give them value, either as a percentage or as a lump sum); see also
Abiud Ochieng, Throw Out Law on Sharing of Family Wealth in Divorce, FIDA Urges 
Court, DAILY NATION (Sept. 13, 2016) http://www.nation.co.ke/news/1056-
3378958-5xtgdlz/index.html.
33. See CONSTITUTION art. 45(3) (2010) (Kenya) (recognizing spouses as equal).
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I.  Background
A. Kenyan Customary Traditions and Governance of Property
Kenya is a multi-ethnic and multi-racial country that lacks a single 
unifying culture.34 Because of its multi-ethnic nature, Kenya benefits 
from a myriad of cultures, each with its own unique attributes spread 
over 40 ethnic groups.35 Prior to the rise of colonialism, all ethnic 
groups in Kenya relied on native rules of custom and tradition for gov-
ernance.36 In 1895, the former British Empire established Kenya as its 
Protectorate, and in 1926, Kenya became a British colony.37 Most eth-
nic communities living in Kenya discriminated against women before 
and after gaining independence from England in 1963.38
For many years, ethnic communities in Kenya have relied on native 
customary laws and practices.39 These customary laws consist of infor-
mal, unwritten rules and constantly-evolving norms that derive legiti-
macy from tradition and custom.40 From the onset of the twentieth cen-
tury to date, ethnic groups in Kenya have viewed women as subservient 
to men.41 Many ethnic communities place women on the same level as 
children, while others view women as chattels and disposable posses-
sions.42 Kenyan society celebrates and accepts the culture of polygamy.43
Some have argued that polygamy subordinates women and propagates 
the de facto inequality between men and women because it enhances the 
34. NEAL SOBANIA, CULTURE AND CUSTOMS OF KENYA 1–2 (Toyin Falola ed., 2003).
35. Id. at 4–5, 13. Ethnic groups include, but are not limited to, Teso, Luo, Luhya, Maa-
sai, Pokot, Turkana, Giriama, Kamba, Meru, Kisii, Chonyi, Nandi, Keiyo, Kipsigis, 
Somali, Samburu, Kikuyu, Borana, and Rendile. For a list of all Tribes in Kenya, see
A List of All the Tribes in Kenya, INFOHUB KENYA (Jun. 2016)
http://www.infohub.co.ke/2016/06/a-list-of-all-tribes-in-kenya.html.
36. Eugene Cotran, The Place and Future of Customary Law in East Africa, 12 INT’L &
COMP. L.Q. SUPP. PUB. 72, 72–75 (1966).
37. See Felicia A. Yieke, Ethnicity and Development in Kenya: Lessons from the 2007 Gen-
eral Elections, 3 KENYA STUD. REV. 8, 9 (2010).
38. See PHOEBE ASIYO, IT IS POSSIBLE: AN AFRICAN WOMAN SPEAKS 18 (2018).
39. Cotran, supra note 36, at 72–75.
40. Cotran, supra note 36, at 73; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 12, at 2.
41. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 12, at 1–2.
42. Id. at 34 (“The Maasai believe that the property within their homestead is theirs—the 
children, the wife, the cows, the land—is all a man’s property.”); Cotran, supra note 
36, at 72–75.
43. Odhiambo & Oduor, supra note 8, at 111–13.
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status of men in society.44 Customary practices remain fluid with subjec-
tive interpretation by the elders, who are often men.45
In Kenya, violation of women’s property rights occurs “across a 
range of ethnic groups, social classes, religions, and geographic re-
gions.”46 Unequal property rights, discriminatory customary practices, 
and colonial-era laws characterize Kenya’s marital property history.47
Two of the unequal practices against women were disinheritance and 
lack of ownership rights.48 For example, the customs and practices of 
ethnic groups reserved property ownership for men.49 Customary laws 
of ethnic groups in Kenya, like the Maasai, considered marital property 
as the husband’s, which he could sell without his wife’s (or his wives’) 
consent.50 Similarly, according to Maasai customs, when women sepa-
rate or divorce from their husbands, they do not leave with any proper-
ty.51 If a woman brings in separate property during the marriage, such 
property remains in the custody of the husband.52 Although new laws 
have rectified this to some extent, these discriminatory customs remain 
in practice due to the lack of awareness by women.53 These practices also 
lock women in abusive marriages; for example, data show that 57 per-
cent of women have experienced intimate partner violence as a result.54
Even when courts grant women access to marital homes, women 
may choose to leave them because of the claim to ancestral land.55
44. Odhiambo and Oduor, supra note 8, at 112.
45. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 12, at 7, 11.
46. Id. at 16.
47. Id. at 7–11, 45.
48. Odhiambo & Oduor, supra note 8, at 107–11, 133–36.
49. Id. at 107–08.
50. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 12, at 34.
51. Id. at 34.
52. See id. at 39.
53. CENTRE FOR WOMEN’S LAND RIGHTS, SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION 
CONCERNING WOMEN’S LAND RIGHTS IN KENYA SUBMITTED TO THE 57 SESSION 
(22 FEB 2016 - 04 MAR 2016) OF THE SEE COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND 
CULTURAL RIGHTS 1, 3 (Jan. 2016), https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CESCR/
Shared%20Documents/KEN/INT_CESCR_CSS_KEN_22888_E.docx.
54. See KENYA NAT’L BUREAU OF STATISTICS ET AL., KENYA DEMOGRAPHIC AND HEALTH 
SURVEY 2014 294 (2014) (finding that 64.3 percent of divorced women report hav-
ing ever experienced violence since age 15 compared to 32.7 percent of never-married 
women.); see also Nita Bhalla, ‘Put Up and Shut Up’: Polygamy Breeds Poverty for Ken-
yan Women and Children, THOMSON REUTERS (Aug. 18, 2014, 8:06 PM), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-kenya-women-polygamy-insight/put-up-and-
shut-up-polygamy-breeds-poverty-for-kenyan-women-and-children-
idUSKBN1L0009 (noting that women in polygamous marriage, even when abusive, 
cannot leave due to the fear of losing property).
55. See Odhiambo & Oduor, supra note 8, at 108–09.
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Ancestral lands have complicated ties to customary laws and practices.
For generations, families in patrilineal lineages have occupied and held 
claim to ancestral lands.56 Accordingly, married women cannot claim 
the husband’s ancestral home. The Kenyan Constitution recognizes the 
value of these lands, and as such, divorcing women can lay little or no 
claim to the land.57 Women end up renting houses and filing separate 
claims for maintenance of children.58 For indigent women, the costs and 
complex procedures violate their right to effective and sufficient judicial 
remedies.59 The complex processes also hinder their access to the courts 
and deny them enhanced access to justice.60
While the situation has considerably changed in law, in practice, 
women’s perceived inferiority remains.61 Kenyan society continues to 
view women as subservient to men, tied to conventional roles such as 
caregivers and housewives.62 Historically and even to date, ethnic com-
munities like the Maasai subject married women to the culture of the 
husband’s tribe, sometimes denying the women the right to make deci-
sions or own property.63 These designs “hold women back from con-
tributing to important development goals[,] especially in the area of 
economic growth.”64 Additionally, women in a marital union, whether 
employed or unemployed, continue to bear the burden of unpaid work 
within the household.
B. The Status of Unpaid Work in the Kenyan Economy
In order to make a case for giving equal weight to monetary and 
non-monetary contribution in Kenya, there is a need to understand how 
56. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 12, at 7.
57. CONSTITUTION art. 63 (2010) (Kenya).
58. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 12, at 26–28.
59. See Odhiambo & Oduor, supra note 8, at 109–10.
60. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Concluding Obser-
vations on the Eighth Periodic Report of Kenya, ¶ 50 U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/KEN/
CO/8 (Nov. 22, 2017), https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/
Download.aspx?symbolno=CEDAW/C/KEN/CO/8&Lang=En [hereinafter Con-
cluding Observations on Eighth Report]  (noting women’s lack of access to justice, 
including upon divorce, particularly due to limited resources); Odhiambo & Oduor, 
supra note 8, at 111–13.
61. See ASIYO, supra note 38, at 18.
62. Inst. of Anthropology, Gender & Afr. Studies, Portrayal of Gender Roles in Kenyan 
Secondary School Textbooks, UNIV. OF NAIROBI, http://african-studies.uonbi.ac.ke/
node/505 (last visited Jan. 30, 2019).
63. See Odhiambo & Oduor, supra note 8, at 112–13.
64. Id.
2019] G E T T I N G  T O  E Q U A L 131
women’s contribution through unpaid work shapes the economy. 
Women in Kenya perform the bulk of uncompensated domestic work.65
Because of this, men view such jobs as disparaging to their own stat-
ure.66 Women collect firewood, cook, and take care of the children—
roles traditionally not performed by men.67 In rural and urban settings 
alike, women fall into the trap where cultural norms label uncompen-
sated domestic work as purely women’s work.68
In 2015, the United Nations General Assembly (“UNGA”) adopt-
ed 17 Sustainable Development Goals. The goals provide a shared blue-
print for peace and prosperity for all people, including women.69 They 
recognize that ending poverty and other deprivations must go hand-in-
hand with strategies that improve health and education, reduce inequali-
ty, and spur economic growth for women.70 In particular, Goal Five 
reads: “States commit to achieve gender equality and empower all wom-
en and girls.”71 This goal calls upon countries to recognize and value 
unpaid care and domestic work through the provision of basic public 
resources and the promotion of shared responsibility within the house-
hold.72
Additionally, in 2013, the Convention on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women (“CEDAW”) Committee expressed 
concerns that women experience a significant decline in household 
65. BUDLENDER & MOUSSIÉ, supra note 22, at 7. The 2015 McKinsey report on gender 
equality shows that women’s contribution to the economy through unpaid work ex-
ceeds that of men. MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., THE POWER OF PARITY: HOW 
ADVANCING WOMEN’S EQUALITY CAN ADD $12 TRILLION TO GLOBAL GROWTH 12
(2015), https://www.mckinsey.com/global-themes/employment-and-growth/how-
advancing-womens-equality-can-add-12-trillion-to-global-growth. The report shows 
that women undertake 75 percent of the world’s total unpaid care work, including 
the vital tasks that keep households functioning, such as child care, caring for the el-
derly, cooking, and cleaning. Id. The report estimates that women’s unpaid work to-
day amounts to as much as $10 trillion of output per year, roughly equivalent to thir-
teen percent of global GDP. Id. Such work delivers essential services that ensure the 
economy progresses without interruption.
66. Chen, supra note 1.
67. Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment in Kenya, USAID,
https://www.usaid.gov/kenya/gender-equality-and-womens-empowerment-kenya 
(last visited Nov. 28, 2018).
68. See Chen, supra note 1.
69. See Goal 5: Gender Equality, UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME,
http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/sustainable-development-goals/goal-5-
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income upon divorce in Kenya.73 The Committee noted that the 
situation is worse in countries without a social welfare system,74 which 
Kenya lacks. Thus, despite women’s contribution to the economic 
welfare of their families, they face severe post-divorce consequences 
given their responsibility as care providers.75
Historically, economic theories failed to recognize unpaid work as a 
part of the mainstream economy.76 Classical economists and neo-
classical economists, such as renowned economists Arthur Pigou and Al-
fred Marshall, considered unpaid work within households as separate 
from the production market and outside of economics.77 This concep-
tion undervalues women’s contribution to the economy.78 Unpaid work 
substitutes services that fall within the responsibility of the govern-
ment.79 These services therefore reduce the burden on the state.80 In the 
absence of the critical support of unpaid work, the state would spend 
much more on public provisions such as basic infrastructure.81 Unpaid
work often ensures access to basic services, such as health care. In places 
where hospitals are located far away and access to ambulance services is 
limited, with the assistance of caregivers, sick people walk the long dis-
tances to reach such services. With a less supportive infrastructure and 
limited access to basic services, unpaid work subsidizes government.82
Uncompensated domestic work is significant and indispensable to 
the goal of development both in developed and developing economies.83
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, General Recommen-
dation on Article 16 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimi-
nation Against Women (Economic Consequences of Marriage, Family Relations and 
Their Dissolution), U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/GC/29, ¶ 4 (Oct. 30, 2013),
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=C
EDAW/C/GC/29&Lang=en.
76. Indira Hirway, Unpaid Work and the Economy: Linkages and Their Implications 9
(Levy Econ. Inst. of Bard College, Working Paper No. 838, 2015).
77. Id.
78. See, e.g., CITI, WOMEN IN THE ECONOMY: GLOBAL GROWTH GENERATORS 11 (May 
2015); Ann Ferguson et al., Feminist Perspectives on Class and Work, STAN.
ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., Spring 2018, at 8–9; Nancy Folbre, Measuring Care: Gender, 
Empowerment and the Care Economy, 7 J. HUM. DEV. 183, 186 (2006); Lotte 
Maaßen, The Effect of Austerity on Unpaid Work and Gender Relations in Europe,
EXPLORING ECON. (Jul. 20, 2017), https://www.exploring-economics.org/en/
discover/austerity-unpaid-work/.




83. See generally id.
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Unpaid work ensures that the daily economy functions and proceeds 
without interruption.84 By narrowing the gender gap through easing the 
burden of unpaid work on women, women stand a better chance of 
competitively participating in the labor market workforce.85 Recent evi-
dence shows that advancing women’s equality will add twenty-eight tril-
lion U.S. dollars to the global gross domestic product by 2025.86 As 
such, Kenya should do its part to advance gender equality, too.
In Kenyan society, the failure to focus on the economic impact of 
unpaid work results in a connection between women’s uncompensated 
work and post-divorce financial crisis.87 As such, the economic conse-
quences of divorce are highly unpredictable, especially for women.88
C. The Hierarchy of Courts in Kenya
Kenya’s 2010 Constitution created a new hierarchy within the ju-
diciary. The highest court in Kenya is the Supreme Court, which may 
hear appeals from the Court of Appeal,89 which is the second highest 
court. The Court of Appeal handles appeals arising over the decisions of 
the High Court, as well as any other court or Tribunal as provided for 
by law.90 The Constitution empowers the High Court, as a trial court,
with original and unlimited jurisdiction to hear all matters, including 
the division of marital property.91 Marital property disputes are civil 
claims in Kenya; therefore, they fall under the jurisdiction of the High 
Court.
84. Id. at 5.
85. JONATHAN WOETZEL ET AL., MCKINSEY & COMPANY, THE POWER OF PARITY: HOW 
ADVANCING WOMEN’S EQUALITY CAN ADD $12 TRILLION TO GLOBAL GROWTH 2 (Se
pt. 2015), https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/employment-and-
growth/How-advancing-womens-equality-can-add-12-trillion-to-global-
growth (follow the “Full Report” hyperlink).
86. Id.
87. David Westfall, Unprincipled Family Dissolution: The American Law Institute’s Rec-
ommendations for Spousal Support and Division of Property, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 917, 920 (2004).
88. Id.; see, e.g., Echaria v. Echaria (2007) Civil Suit No. 663 of 2007, e.K.L.R. 1 
(H.C.K.) (Kenya) (awarding the wife only 25 percent of the marital assets after 34
years of marriage.); V.W.N. v. F.N. (2015), Civil Appeal No. 179 of 2009, e.K.L.R 
(C.A.K.) (Kenya) (awarding the husband 70 percent and the wife 30 percent of the 
marital assets after 10 years of marriage and reversing a lower court’s equal division of 
the property).
89. CONSTITUTION art. 163 (2010) (Kenya).
90. CONSTITUTION art. 164 (2010) (Kenya).
91. See CONSTITUTION art. 165 (2010) (Kenya).
134 michigan  jo urn al  o f  g ender & la w [Vol. 26:121
II. Theories of Marriage and Property Division
Cost-benefit analysis, game theory, and division of labor are the
three major economic theories of marriage.92 Cost-benefit analysis is de-
fined as a weighing scale approach for estimating all costs involved in 
and possible profits to be derived from an opportunity or proposal.93
The analysis ascertains the security of the proposal and provides a basis 
for making comparisons with others.94 Cost-benefit analysis considers 
whether the marginal cost of doing something is worth more or less 
than the benefit that would be received from it.95 The approach puts all 
the positives (benefits) on one side and the negatives (costs) on the other 
side; whichever weighs heavier forms the basis for decision-making.96
In marriage, cost-benefit analysis compares whether people marry 
for love or for practical reasons, such as getting a spouse to do the 
household work.97 Professor Evelyn Lehrer, a leading scholar in the field 
of economics of union formation and dissolution, proposes that men 
and women may perform such an analysis even when the factors consid-
ered as costs and benefits differ.98 Marina Adshade, an economics pro-
fessor at the University of British Columbia, argues that people marry 
because of the opportunity to share consumption.99 Adshade also argues 
that “marriage is about consuming and valuing that consumption.”100
For example, a man with a higher income could marry so that he spe-
cializes in income earning as his spouse takes care of the household.101
On the other hand, game theory describes the strategic decision-
making used when dealing with situations where the outcome of one’s 
92. Shoshana Grossbard-Shechtman, Marriage and the Economy, in MARRIAGE AND THE 
ECONOMY: THEORY AND EVIDENCE FROM ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL SOCIETIES 2
(Shoshana A. Grossbard-Shechtman ed., 2003).
93. Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 YALE L.J.
165, 176–77 (1999).
94. Id. at 178.
95. Fred Anderson et al., Regulatory Improvement Legislation: Risk Assessment, Cost-Benefit 
Analysis, and Judicial Review, 11 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 89, 92 (2000).
96. Adler & Posner, supra note 99, at 178–79.
97. Evelyn L. Lehrer, The Economics of Divorce, in MARRIAGE AND THE ECONOMY:
THEORY AND EVIDENCE FROM ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL SOCIETIES, supra note 92, at
56.
98. See id.
99. Erich Saide, What Do the Numbers Say? A Cost-Benefit Analysis of Love and Sex,
GLOBE & MAIL, (Feb. 28, 2013), https://www.theglobeandmail.com/life/
relationships/what-do-the-numbers-say-a-cost-benefit-analysis-of-love-and-sex/
article9159919/ (last updated May 11, 2018).
100. Id.
101. Id.
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choice of action depends on the choice of action of the other partici-
pants.102 Under game theory, each person in a marriage tries to further 
his or her interest but is limited by the presence of the other partner. 
Game theory presupposes that married couples should cooperate in de-
cision-making in order to achieve the most benefits.103
Just like renowned economist Gary Becker, Professor Lehrer views 
marriage as a household production system that allows for the efficient 
division of labor.104 Becker “sees marriage in terms of an exchange of 
domestic services, typically by the female, in exchange for long-term fi-
nancial support.”105 The unequal burden of unpaid work on women di-
vides the labor market on gender lines.106 The gendered distribution of 
work has an underlying link to the economics of marriage.107 It shows 
that women’s burden of unpaid work is tied to the gendered role differ-
entiation of parties in the household as a production unit.108 In the 
household, women perform the bulk of unpaid work as opposed to 
men.109 The household, as a production and consumption unit, provides 
a link between household economy and monetized economy.110 As such, 
the exclusion of unpaid work from economics fosters patriarchal values 
and bias against such work. Therefore, it is necessary to incorporate un-
paid work within the boundaries of the macro-economy.111
Recent scholars like Alicia B. Kelly recognize marriage as a form of 
partnership where spouses make financial and non-financial 
contributions towards the marital unit.112 Several jurisdictions adopted 
the approach of equal property division using the partnership model.113
The partnership model conceives of a marriage as a place of equality in 




104. Lehrer, supra note 97, at 56.
105. Antony W. Dnes, The Division of Marital Assets Following Divorce, 25 J.L. & SOC’Y
336, 340 (1998).
106. Hirway, supra note 76, at 12.
107. Id. at 7.
108. Id. at 12.
109. Id. at 5.
110. Id. at 1–2.
111. See generally Hirway, supra note 76 (discussing the patriarchal implications of exclud-
ing unpaid work from economic calculations).
112. Alicia B. Kelly, Rehabilitating Partnership Marriage as a Theory of Wealth Distribution 
at Divorce: In Recognition of a Shared Life, 19 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 141, 157 (2004).
113. A partnership model presents a form of an updated contractual model of marriage. 
The model argues that spouses in the partnership are equal and they contribute to 
and share in the benefits equally. See id. at 158.
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which both spouses contribute to and share in the benefits and costs 
equally.114 This means that each spouse has an equal, vested interest in 
the property acquired during marriage.115
Scholar Antony Dnes says that equal division of property meets 
demands for lost career opportunities, especially for the homemaker 
spouse.116 Because of the division of labor in the marriage, the female 
employment rate decreases with marriage.117 Lehrer argues that the equi-
table division of labor within the family unit increases productivity and 
represents key gains from marriage; for example, if one spouse becomes 
unemployed, the level of labor force participation may increase for the 
other spouse.118 The unemployed spouse does more unpaid work than 
the employed spouse.119 Because the unemployed spouse provides criti-
cal support, the career prospects of the other spouse will advance.120 Ev-
idence shows that more often than not, women tend to specialize in 
home production.121 Therefore, women are most likely to provide the 
critical support towards advancing the career trajectory of the man. 
Even when working as a full-time homemaker or working both in the 
labor market and at home, home production affects the wife’s earnings 
by lowering her stock of labor market-related human capital.122 Labor 
market-related human capital refers to the education, skills, and health 
of women.
Economic theories stipulate that individuals with greater amounts 
of labor market-oriented human capital benefit from higher earnings, 
while “a wife’s home production affects her own earnings by lowering 
her stock of labor market-related human capital.”123 When women bear 
the burden of unpaid work, it lowers their human capital.124 Time spent 
on housework rather than at a salaried job consistently produces a nega-
114. Marjorie Kornhauser, Theory Versus Reality: The Partnership Model of Marriage in 
Family and Income Tax Law, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 1413, 1416–17 (1996).
115. See Kelly, supra note 112.
116. Dnes, supra note 105, at 350.
117. Lehrer, supra note 97, at 66.
118. Id. at 56.
119. Id.; contra Patrick Parkinson, Quantifying the Homemaker Contribution in Family 
Property Law, 31 FED. L. REV. 1, 45 (2003) (arguing that women experience the 
double burden or triple burden in household work whether employed or unem-
ployed).
120. Lehrer, supra note 97, at 57.
121. See BUDLENDER & MOUSSIÉ, supra note 22, at 4, 20.
122. Joni Hersch, Marriage, Household Production, and Earnings, in MARRIAGE AND THE 
ECONOMY: THEORY AND EVIDENCE FROM ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL SOCIETIES, supra
note 92, at 216.
123. Id. at 207.
124. Hirway, supra note 76.
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tive relationship between housework and wages, particularly for wom-
en.125 Because of the increase of the burden of uncompensated domestic 
work on women, their earnings decrease as stated. In addition, women 
may miss opportunities for higher income because of the burden of un-
compensated domestic work. Consequently, when courts undervalue 
such work, they impede women’s economic growth, causing negative 
economic impact.
Joni Hersch, a leading scholar in the field of economics, compares 
different methods of valuing the economic and non-economic contribu-
tion of spouses.126 One of the methods analyzed by Hersch is the human 
capital method.127 This method provides for equal division of property 
regardless of economic and non-economic spousal contribution.128 In 
the United States case of Wendt v. Wendt (2000), the Connecticut 
Court of Appeals rejected the human capital method and based the 
award of two million dollars on the wife’s needs.129 In the case, the court 
valued the woman’s non-monetary contribution based on her needs and 
her role as a corporate wife.130
These theories of marriage and property division provide a lens 
through which to view Kenya’s marital property division on divorce.131
Article 45(3) of the Constitution of Kenya advances the equality of par-
ties in a marriage, which follows the definition of marriage in a partner-
ship model.132
III. Marital Property Law in Kenya: 
Origins and Modern Reach
A. Origins and Constitutional Change
In 1882, the British Parliament enacted the Married Women’s 
Property Act to guarantee women’s separate ownership and control of 
property upon marriage.133 The MWPA affirmed a woman’s right to 
125. Id.
126. See Hersch, supra note 122, at 216.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 217.
129. See Wendt v. Wendt, 757 A.2d 1225, 1237 (2000).
130. See Wendt, 757 A2d at 1233.
131. The Matrimonial Property Act, No. 49 (2013) (Kenya).
132. See, e.g., Baraza, supra note 10.
133. Odhiambo & Oduor, supra note 8, at 113–14.
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own property in her own name.134 In legislating marital property rights, 
Kenya adopted the legislation from England.135 Although the MWPA 
dispelled, in part, the discriminatory cultural practices against women, 
women’s pursuit of equal property ownership failed to materialize.
Though the MWPA did not recognize non-monetary contribution 
to marital assets, the law changed how courts perceived women’s prop-
erty rights.136 In accordance with the provisions of the law, married 
women could only benefit in the division of the marital estate if they 
had made substantial monetary contributions. As such, women under-
taking uncompensated domestic work had limited benefits from the 
law. 
Due to changing social structures in England and the need for 
change sparked by women’s rights movements, the British Parliament 
shifted matrimonial property and divorce governance in 1974 to the 
Matrimonial Causes Act of 1973.137 Meanwhile, Kenya’s marital proper-
ty regime continued to rely on the century-old MWPA.138 Kenya’s mari-
tal property regime only began to change in 2010, when Kenyans 
adopted a new and progressive Constitution, hailed as one of the most 
pro-citizen frameworks in Kenya.139 Article 27 of the Constitution pro-
vides that: “women and men have the right to equal treatment, includ-
ing the right to equal opportunities in political, economic, cultural and 
social spheres.”140 Article 45(3) establishes equality within marriage and 
provides that: “Parties to a marriage are entitled to equal rights at the 
time of the marriage, during the marriage and at the dissolution of the 
marriage.”141 With a progressive Bill of Rights, the Constitution provid-
ed remedies that addressed the existing gender inequalities.142
In addition, Article 2(4) of the Constitution provides that: “any 
law, including customary law, which is inconsistent with this Constitu-
tion is void to the extent of the inconsistency, and any act or omission 
in contravention of this Constitution is invalid.”143 In theory, this means 
that even customary law that does not treat women equally is invalid. 
134. See id.
135. Married Women’s Property Act 1882, 45 & 46 Vict. c. 75 (Eng.); see Odhiambo &
Oduor, supra note 8, at 113 (“The English Married Women’s Property Act 
(‘MWPA’) of 1882 was imported as a statute of general application [in Kenya].”).
136. See Odhiambo & Oduor, supra note 8, at 116.
137. The Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, c. 18 § 25(2) (Eng.).
138. See Baraza, supra note 10, at 5.
139. Odhiambo & Oduor, supra note 8, at 123.
140. CONSTITUTION art. 27 (2010) (Kenya).
141. CONSTITUTION art. 45(3) (2010) (Kenya).
142. Odhiambo & Oduor, supra note 8, at 124.
143. CONSTITUTION art. 2(4) (2010) (Kenya).
2019] G E T T I N G  T O  E Q U A L 139
B. Kenya’s International Obligations Toward Gender Equality
Toward the last decades of the twentieth century, Kenya signed 
and ratified major human rights conventions in compliance with inter-
national human rights standards.144 Kenya ratified the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) and the Convention 
on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (“CEDAW”) in 
1972 and 1984, respectively.145 In ratifying the two human rights con-
ventions, Kenya imposed on itself a duty to respect, protect, and pro-
mote the rights of all citizens, including women. Under CEDAW, Ken-
ya had an obligation to end biased and exclusionary practices against 
women through the enactment of progressive laws and practices.146 As a 
result, the courts began to reflect a change in their reasoning regarding 
gender responsibilities for men and women in marriage. 
As the women’s rights movement gained momentum through 
global developments and internal push by advocates, Kenya took steps 
to reform its existing marital property laws.147 At the time, the United 
Nations member countries, including Kenya, adopted and committed 
to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (“MDG”), which called 
upon world leaders to combat discrimination against women.148
Goal Three of the MDG called on countries to: “[p]romote gender 
equality in all levels of education and empower women.”149
144. Baraza, supra note 10, at 2; Ratification Status of Kenya, UNITED NATIONS HUMAN 
RIGHTS OFF. HIGH COMMISSIONER, https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/
TreatyBodyExternal/Treaty.aspx?CountryID=90&Lang=EN (last visited Apr. 12, 
2019).
145. See Ratification Status of Kenya, supra note 150. The UNGA adopted the ICCPR in 
1966 as an instrument to protect and promote civil and political rights of individuals 
across the world and to recognize the inherent dignity of all individuals, calling upon 
states to provide conditions for enjoyment of civil and political rights. G.A. Res. 
2200A (XXI), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Dec. 16, 1966).
In 1979, the UNGA adopted CEDAW as an international treaty, entrenching com-
prehensive women rights and requiring countries to eliminate discriminatory practic-
es against women and promote the equal status of women and girls in society. G.A. 
Res. 34/180, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women (Dec. 18, 1979).
146. See Joy K. Asiema, Gender Equality and the Legal Process: The Kenyan Experience, 10 
TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 561, 562–63 (2000).
147. Odhiambo & Oduor, supra note 8, at 99–100.
148. G.A. Res 52/2 United Nations Millennium Declaration, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., 
U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/2 (Sept. 8, 2000); see also United Nations Millennium Devel-
opment Goals, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/ (last visited 
Jan. 28, 2019).
149. Id.
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Furthermore, during Kenya’s periodic review before the CEDAW, the 
Committee recommended that courts equate nonmonetary contribution 
to monetary contribution during property division.150 Other 
recommendations included awarding women an equal share in property 
regardless of the nature of their contribution and broadening the 
definition of marital property to include both tangible and non-tangible 
assets.151
During its forty-eighth session in 2011, the CEDAW Committee 
suggested that Kenya should broaden the meaning of matrimonial prop-
erty to advance women’s equality and meet the existing international 
standards.152 The Committee emphasized the need for equality in divid-
ing marital assets.153 The human rights body made several key recom-
mendations for Kenya’s consideration. First, the Committee recom-
mended that in dividing assets between men and women in marriage, 
economic and non-economic contribution should be accorded the same 
weight.154 Second, in assessing potential post-divorce economic conse-
quences, the courts should consider the woman’s loss of economic op-
portunity.155 Third, the Committee noted that courts have to evaluate 
the financial or non-financial investment in development of a husband’s 
economic activity.156 Finally, on the definition of matrimonial property, 
the Committee recommended that all property accumulated during the 
marriage, including real estate, household goods, savings and invest-
ments, interest in pensions or retirement accounts, businesses, and in-
creases in value of non-marital property, forms part of the marital es-
150. See Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Concluding Ob-
servations of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women: 
Kenya, ¶¶ 12, 42, 46, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/KEN/CO/7 (Feb. 2, 2011) [hereinaf-
ter Concluding Observations on Kenya].
151. Id. ¶ 45.
152. Concluding Observations on Kenya, supra note 150, ¶¶ 46, 52.
153. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, General Recommen-
dation No. 21: Equality in Marriage and Family Relations, ¶ 34, U.N. Doc. 
CEDAW/C/G/21 (1994), https://www.refworld.org/docid/48abd52c0.html [herein-
after General Recommendation No. 21].
154. Id. ¶ 32; see also Concluding Observations on Eighth Report, supra note 60, ¶ 50(b) 
(expressing concern about “the requirement to prove contribution to marital property 
under the Matrimonial Property Act of 2013, which discriminates against women 
who face challenges proving and quantifying non-monetary contributions”). The 
Committee recommended a repeal of Section 7 of the Matrimonial Property Act and 
for the State to recognize the principle of equality in all areas of marriage, including 
property. Id. ¶ 51(a).
155. Concluding Observations on Kenya, supra note 150, ¶ 45.
156. Id.
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tate.157 Kenya reserved the application of CEDAW recommendations
and enacted its new matrimonial property law without the CEDAW 
Committee’s suggested changes.158
In 2013, the CEDAW Committee, in its General Recommenda-
tion No. 29, discouraged polygamous marriages, as they contravene 
women’s rights by imposing serious emotional and financial conse-
quences.159 The violations affect women and their dependents; therefore,
the CEDAW Committee recommended that state parties like Kenya 
abolish polygamous marriages to ensure equal property rights after di-
vorce.160
C. The Current State of the Matrimonial Property Regime in Kenya
The Constitution that Kenya adopted in 2010 provided for 
equality in marriage and was hailed as a beacon of hope for many 
women.161 The principle of equality in marriage signified a major win 
for women’s rights and a step toward ending discriminatory practices 
against women. In the years following the passage of the Constitution, 
Article 45(3) became a guiding principle and a basis for determining 
marital property disputes.162 As a result, some courts adopted an 
equitable-share approach in dividing marital property; however, others 
ruled against such an approach.163 Thus, despite the Constitution’s
157. Id.
158. Compare Concluding Observations on Eighth Report, supra note 60, with The Mat-
rimonial Property Act, No. 49 (showing that Kenya rejected the CEDAW’s recom-
mendations in its new law).
159. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, General Recommen-
dation 29, Economic Consequences of Marriage, Family Relations, and their Dissolution,
¶ 27 U.N. Doc. (Feb. 26, 2013) http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cedaw/docs/
comments/CEDAW-C-52-WP-1_en.pdf [hereinafter General Recommendation 29]; 
Bhalla, supra note 54.
160. General Recommendation 29, supra note 159.
161. CONSTITUTION art. 45(3) (2010) (Kenya) (“Parties to a marriage are entitled to 
equal rights at the time of the marriage, during the marriage[,] and at the dissolution 
of the marriage.”).
162. See, e.g., M.W.M. v. H.M.M. (2017) Civil Suit No. 75 of 2014, e.K.L.R. (H.C.K.) 
(Kenya); F.S., Matrimonial Cause No. 16 of 2014, e.K.L.R.; U.M.M. v. I.M.M. 
(2014) Civil Suit No. 39 of 2012, e.K.L.R. (H.C.K.) (Kenya).
163. See, e.g., M.W.M. v. H.M.M. (2017) Civil Suit No. 75 of 2014, e.K.L.R. (H.C.K.) 
(Kenya) (deciding that each spouse is entitled to 50 percent of the marital estate in 
the absence of actual evidence of contribution of either party); F.S., Matrimonial 
Cause No. 16 of 2014, e.K.L.R. (arguing that the husband should get the bulk of the 
property because of his monetary contribution); U.M.M. v. I.M.M. (2014) Civil Suit 
No. 39 of 2012, e.K.L.R. (H.C.K.) (Kenya) (arguing that Article 45(3) of the 
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provision for equality, women encounter varying interpretations on the 
meaning of equality during property division on divorce under Article 
45(3) of the Constitution.164
Following the passage of the Constitution in 2010 and the 
CEDAW Committee’s recommendations in 2011, Kenya enacted a self-
governing matrimonial property law, the Matrimonial Property Act, in 
2013.165 The enactment of the MPA effectively repealed the MWPA as 
it applied to Kenya.166 The MPA limits the definition of matrimonial 
property to only tangible assets.167 Section 6 of the MPA states: “matri-
monial property means— (a) the matrimonial home or homes, (b) 
household goods and effects in the matrimonial home or homes; or (c) 
any other immovable and movable property jointly owned and acquired 
during the subsistence of the marriage.”168 Section 7 of the MPA pro-
vides that: “ownership of matrimonial property vests in the spouses ac-
cording to the contribution of either spouse towards its acquisition, and 
shall be divided between the spouses if they divorce or their marriage is 
otherwise dissolved.”169 The MPA also defines “contribution,” stating 
that it “means monetary and non-monetary contribution and in-
cludes— (a) domestic work and management of the matrimonial home; 
(b) child care; (c) companionship; (d) management of family business or 
Constitution does not grant an automatic 50:50 sharing of the marital estate and that 
such an approach would derail the institution of marriage).
164. CONSTITUTION art. 45(3) (2010) (Kenya) (“Parties to a marriage are entitled to equal 
rights at the time of the marriage, during the marriage[,] and at the dissolution of the 
marriage.”); see P.N.N. v. Z.W.N. (2017) Civil Appeal No. 128 of 2014, e.K.L.R. 
(C.A.K.) (Kenya) (“I am unpersuaded that the provision commands a 50:50 parti-
tioning of marital property upon the dissolution of the marriage.”); C.M.N. v. 
A.W.M. (2013) Envtl. & Land Case 208 of 2012, e.K.L.R (H.C.K.) (Kenya) (“It has 
been established without a doubt that the Plaintiff is the one who met all the finan-
cial requirements towards the acquisition of the Suit Property. However, the legal 
landscape has changed so that it is no longer a question of how much each spouse 
contributed towards the purchase of a matrimonial property which matters . . . . [B]y 
registering the Defendant as the joint owner of the Suit Property, the Defendant ac-
quired, jointly with the Plaintiff, absolute ownership in the Suit Property that cannot 
be challenged or simply wished away. It can be said that the Plaintiff gifted the De-
fendant a half share in the Suit Property. That gift cannot be taken away from her.”); 
F.S. v. E.Z. (2016) Matrimonial Cause No. 16 of 2014, e.K.L.R. (H.C.K.) (Kenya) 
(rejecting the equality of spousal contribution); M.W.G. v. T.K.G. (2016) Civil Case 
No. 15 of 2014, e.K.L.R. (H.C.K.) (Kenya) (upholding the equality of spousal con-
tribution).
165. See, e.g., The Matrimonial Property Act, No. 49.
166. The Matrimonial Property Act, No. 49 § 19.
167. The Matrimonial Property Act, No. 49 § 6.
168. The Matrimonial Property Act, No. 49 § 6.
169. The Matrimonial Property Act, No. 49 § 7.
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property; and (e) farm work.”170 Therefore, the MPA explicitly recogniz-
es non-monetary contribution. 
The MPA contains several other key provisions that relate to mat-
rimonial property. Section 12 requires spousal consent before selling or 
mortgaging property.171 Section 11 provides that, subject to the Consti-
tution, the courts shall take into account the customary law relating to 
divorce or dissolution of marriage and the protection of ancestral land as 
required under Article 63 of the Constitution.172 Therefore, upon di-
vorce, women cannot claim ownership of historically ancestral or com-
munity-owned land. Women have suffered economic hardship post-
divorce because of this.173 Like the Constitution, the Section 7 of the 
MPA provides that each spouse is a separate individual with separate le-
gal and property rights.174 Thus, each spouse has the ability to acquire 
and own individual income or property.175 Section 6 provides that even 
where customary law marriages exist, spouses have the capacity to own 
and manage their property.176
Section 8 of the MPA provides for the acquisition of property in 
polygamous marriage, taking into account any contributions made by 
the husband and each of his wives.177 Yet, this section perpetuates une-
qual property rights between men and women in polygamous unions.178
In Kenya, the polygamous culture allows a man to marry many wives, 
while society frowns upon women with numerous partners.179 The MPA 
remains silent.180
170. The Matrimonial Property Act, No. 49 § 2.
171. The Matrimonial Property Act, No. 49 § 12(5) (2013) (Kenya).
172. The Matrimonial Property Act, No. 49 § 11 (2013) (Kenya) (“During the division of 
matrimonial property between and among spouses, the customary law of the com-
munities in question shall, subject to the values and principles of the Constitution, be 
taken into account including— . . . the customary law relating to divorce or dissolu-
tion of marriage; the principle of protection of rights of future generations to com-
munity and ancestral land as provided for under Article 63 of the Constitution.”).
173. Bhalla, supra note 54; Ruth H. Kaddari & Marsha A. Freeman, Economic Conse-
quences of Marriage and its Dissolution: Applying a Universal Equality Norm in a Frag-
mented Universe, 13 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 323, 334 (2012).
174. CONSTITUTION art. 40 (2010) (Kenya); The Matrimonial Property Act, No. 49 § 7.
175. CONSTITUTION art. 40 (2010) (Kenya); The Matrimonial Property Act, No. 49 § 7.
176. The Matrimonial Property Act, No. 49 § 6.
177. The Matrimonial Property Act, No. 49 § 8.
178. The Matrimonial Property Act, No. 49 § 8.
179. Odhiambo and Oduor, supra note 8, at 112.
180. The Matrimonial Property Act, No. 49.
144 michigan  jo urn al  o f  g ender & la w [Vol. 26:121
The Constitution and the MPA repealed imbalanced laws and rein-
forced Kenya’s commitment to advance gender equality.181 The Consti-
tution counsels against discrimination based on sex, pregnancy, and 
marital status and provides for equal rights in marriages.182 And, despite 
its limitations, the MPA defines matrimonial property for the first 
time.183 It defines contribution, provides for the property rights of par-
ties in polygamous unions and customary marriages, and recognizes pre-
nuptial agreements and acquisition of interest in property by contribu-
tion.184
As with the principle of equality in marriage, the legal recognition 
of non-monetary contribution to the marital unit shows progress in 
women’s rights.185 In legislating what qualifies as a non-monetary con-
tribution, Parliament reformed the inequality of women’s uncompen-
sated domestic work in Kenya.186 The legal recognition of such contri-
bution eliminates the frequent application of discriminatory laws and 
practices against women’s property ownership.187 Further, it ensures that 
women’s work within the duration of marriage is recognized as work ra-
ther than a marital obligation.
Although the MPA now explicitly defines non-monetary contribu-
tion, in implementing the provision, the courts have undervalued wom-
en’s uncompensated domestic work and given differing interpretations 
of its value.188 The emerging jurisprudence currently reflects a shift from 
the initial approach of equal division adopted by the courts from 2010 
to 2013. Women’s rights activist groups like FIDA-Kenya continue to 
181. CONSTITUTION art. 27(3) (2010) (Kenya); see also CONSTITUTION art. 45 (2010) 
(Kenya).
182. CONSTITUTION art. 27(3)–(4), 45(3) (2010) (Kenya).
183. The Matrimonial Property Act, No. 49 § 2, 6–8 (2013) (Kenya).
184. The Matrimonial Property Act, No. 49 § 2, 6–8 (2013) (Kenya).
185. The Matrimonial Property Act, No. 49 § 2; CONSTITUTION art. 45 (2010) (Kenya).
186. Lucyline Nkatha Murungi, Consolidating Family Laws in Kenya, 17 EUR. J.L.
REFORM. 317, 327 (2015).
187. Kaddari & Freeman, supra note 173, at 335.
188. See, e.g., U.M.M. v. I.M.M. (2014) Civil Suit No. 39 of 2012, e.K.L.R. (H.C.K.) 
(Kenya) (ruling that monetary contribution is on a higher pedestal than non-
monetary contribution and opining that valuing non-monetary contributions “would 
give opportunity to a fortune seeker to contract a marriage, sit back without making 
any monetary or non-monetary contribution, distress the union and wait to reap half 
the marital property”); M.W.G. v. T.K.G. (2016) Civil Case No. 15 of 2014, 
e.K.L.R. (H.C.K.) (Kenya) (ruling that non-monetary contribution is equal to mone-
tary contribution and stating that it would be “impossible to attach any value to such 
marital chores as companionship, parental child care and management of a matrimo-
nial home”).
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criticize some aspects of the MPA for eroding the constitutional gains 
made in achieving gender equality in 2010.189
In 2018, FIDA-Kenya unsuccessfully challenged the constitutional-
ity of Section 7 of the MPA as read together with Article 45 of the Con-
stitution.190 Section 7 of the MPA implies that each spouse should prove 
their contribution toward acquisition of matrimonial property.191 In its 
case, FIDA-Kenya argued that Section 7 of the MPA offends Article 45 
of the Constitution because it calls for proof of contribution contrary to 
the principle of equality in marriage.192 In dismissing the petition, the 
court held that Section 7 of the MPA “does not offend any provisions of 
the Constitution as alleged,” and “[b]y providing that a party walks out 
with his or her entitlement based on his or her contribution, the section 
entrenches the principle of equality in marriage.”193
At times, courts’ traditional values and biases have also influenced 
some decisions when evaluating non-monetary contribution.194 For 
example, in F.S. v. E.Z. (2016), the court acknowledged the woman’s 
non-monetary contribution but held that the husband deserved the bulk 
of the property since he made the monetary contribution.195 In addition, 
Patrick Parkinson, a leading specialist in the field of family law, argues 
that in cases where a man is a caregiver, the courts elaborate more on the 
facts.196 In contrast, caring work disappears from view where it is the 
woman’s role.197 Thus, some courts that deal with division of marital 
189. Murungi, supra note 186, at 321.
190. Fed’n of Women Lawyers Kenya (FIDA) v. Hon. Att’y Gen. (2018) Petition No. 
164B of 2016, e.K.L.R. (H.C.K.) (Kenya).
191. The Matrimonial Property Act, No. 49 § 7 (2013) (Kenya) (“ownership of matrimo-
nial property vests in the spouses according to the contribution of either spouse to-
wards its acquisition, and shall be divided between the spouses if they divorce or their 
marriage is otherwise dissolved.”).
192. Fed’n of Women Lawyers Kenya (FIDA), Petition No. 164B of 2016, e.K.L.R.
193. Fed’n of Women Lawyers Kenya (FIDA), Petition No. 164B of 2016, e.K.L.R.
194. See Nderitu v. Nderitu (1997) Civil Appeal 203 of 1997, e.K.L.R. (H.C.K.) (Kenya) 
(devaluing the wife’s contribution and ruling that since the wife gave birth through 
caesarian section, her capacity to acquire property towards the marital estate dimin-
ished) (reversed on appeal); see also F.S. v. E.Z. (2016) Matrimonial Cause No. 16 of 
2014, e.K.L.R. (H.C.K.) (Kenya) (holding that non-monetary contribution weighed 
less than monetary contribution).
195. F.S., Matrimonial Cause No. 16 of 2014, e.K.L.R. (“[M]arriages would be converted 
to economic traps whereby an individual would lure a rich man or woman, get mar-
ried to them and soon thereafter seek divorce. Such a person can repeat the same pro-
cess with another spouse and enrich himself or herself without making any monetary 
contribution.”).
196. Regina Graycar, Gendered Assumptions in Family Law Decision-Making, 22 FED. L.
REV. 278, 289 (1994).
197. See id.
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assets consider the work of men caregivers as exceptional, in contrast to 
women’s daily routine as homemakers and breadwinners.198
In order to make these court decisions more predictable and uni-
form, and to ensure that courts are deciding these cases with the consti-
tutional principle of spousal equality in mind, Parliament should adopt, 
by statute, specific factors the courts should address. Currently, the lack 
of statutory factors leaves the door wide open for trial courts to deter-
mine applicable factors in any given circumstance.199 The judicial deci-
sion-making demonstrates the bias against women’s non-monetary con-
tribution, whether explicit or implicit. These decisions have produced 
outcomes riddled with inconsistency and arbitrariness.200 The addition 
of statutory factors would address these concerns.
Additionally, Kenya has come under scrutiny from the CEDAW 
Committee for its current law on distribution of marital property in di-
vorce cases. During Kenya’s review in 2017, the CEDAW Committee 
noted that some provisions of the MPA, as currently drafted, continue 
to perpetuate unfair practices against women.201 The Committee stated 
that Section 7 of the MPA deprives women of their fundamental right
to property and violates equal protection before the law as required un-
der the Convention.202 The MPA’s definition of matrimonial property is 
198. Id. at 288.
199. P.W.K. v. J.K.G. (2015) Civil Appeal No. 33 of 2014, e.K.L.R. (C.A.K.) (Kenya) 
(considering the husband’s wasteful disposition of assets & transfer of matrimonial 
property to third parties); S.N.K. v. M.S.K. (2015) Civil Appeal No. 139 of 2010, 
e.K.L.R. (C.A.K.) (Kenya) (considering matrimonial property held in a limited liabil-
ity company as well as provisions for minor children).
200. U.M.M. v. I.M.M. (2014) Civil Suit No. 39 of 2012, e.K.LR. (H.C.K.) (Kenya) (ar-
guing that Article 45(3) of the Constitution does not grant an automatic 50:50 shar-
ing of the marital estate and that entitlement is proportionate to contribution);
M.W.G. v. T.K.G., Civil Case No. 15 of 2014, e.K.L.R. (H.C.K.) (Kenya) (explain-
ing that it would be impossible to attach any value to non-monetary contributions 
such as companionship, parental child care, and management of a matrimonial 
home); F.S. v. E.Z. (2016) Matrimonial Cause No. 16 of 2014, e.K.L.R. (H.C.K.) 
(Kenya) (holding in favor of the husband, who made monetary contribution, as op-
posed to the wife, who made  non-monetary contribution). For further discussion of 
the reasons why judicial discretion at divorce needs curtailment, see Marsha Garrison, 
How Do Judges Decide Divorce Cases: An Empirical Analysis of Discretionary Decision 
Making, 74 N.C. L. REV. 401, 412, 552 (1996) (arguing that indeterminate judicial 
standards have produced inequitable results) [hereinafter How Do Judges Decide].
201. Concluding Observations on Eighth Report, supra note 60, ¶¶ 50–51.
202. The Matrimonial Property Act, No. 49 § 7 (2013) (Kenya) (“ownership of matrimo-
nial property vests in the spouses according to the contribution of either spouse to-
wards its acquisition, and shall be divided between the spouses if they divorce or their 
marriage is otherwise dissolved.”).
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limited to property jointly owned by the spouses.203 This definition ex-
cludes other properties that may not be jointly owned, but could qualify 
as matrimonial property, such as intellectual property, business good-
will, and life insurance, therefore limiting the pool of marital assets.204 In 
addition, the MPA requires spouses to prove their contribution towards 
the acquisition of such property during the divorce.205 This implies that 
women who do not prove their non-monetary contribution lose their 
property. Thus, the CEDAW Committee recommended that Kenya 
“[r]epeal section 7 of the [MPA] and recognize the principle of equality 
in all areas of marriage, including property.”206
IV. Judicial Decision-Making under Kenya’s Matrimonial
Property Law: Contribution and Property Division
A. Judicial Approach to Spousal Contribution
Courts in Kenya have reached inconsistent decisions on the weight 
of non-monetary contribution in determining property allocation 
among spouses on divorce. Some courts have embraced the constitu-
tional principle of equality in marriage by granting each spouse a 50 
percent distribution of marital property on divorce, while others have 
downplayed the value of non-monetary contribution and given spouses 
whose contributions were mostly non-monetary less than 50 percent of 
marital assets on divorce.
In Kenya, the Constitution and the MPA provide guiding tools to 
the courts in valuing spousal contribution to marital property.207
Kenyan courts have interpreted the Constitution differently in 
explaining its provision for equality in marriage. In A.N.W. v. 
J.P.N.V.G. (2011), the court stated that “Article 45(3) of the 
Constitution provides that parties are equal in marriage. The equality 
also extends to matrimonial property and is a constitutional statement 
of the principle that marital property is shared 50-50 in the event that a 
marriage ends.”208 However, in rejecting an equal division, the court in 
203. The Matrimonial Property Act, No. 49 § 6(1).
204. Concluding Observations on Kenya, supra note 150, ¶ 5.
205. The Matrimonial Property Act, No. 49 § 7.
206. Concluding Observations on Eighth Report, supra note 60, ¶ 51.
280. The Matrimonial Property Act, No. 49 § 2 (2013) (Kenya); CONSTITUTION art. 45 
(2010) (Kenya).
208. J.P.V.G. v. A.N.W. (2011) Divorce Cause No. 19 of 2004, e.K.L.R (C.A.K.) (Ken-
ya) (upholding the principle of equality in marriage and stating that Article 45 of the 
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P.W.K. v. J.K.G. (2015) interpreted Article 45 of the Constitution as 
follows:
Where the disputed property is not so registered in the joint 
names of the spouses but is registered in the name of 
one spouse, the beneficial share of each spouse would ulti-
mately depend on their proven respective proportions of fi-
nancial contribution either direct or indirect towards the ac-
quisition of the property. However, in cases where each 
spouse has made a substantial but unascertainable contribu-
tion, it may be equitable to apply the maxim Equality or eq-
uity . . . .209
This shows the inconsistency in court interpretations of the Constitu-
tion as it applies to marriage and property division. 
Additionally, the MPA does not guide courts on how to account 
for non-monetary contribution, and it lacks factors that can assist courts 
in valuing the homemaker contribution.210 Thus, courts have broad dis-
cretion to determine the weight of non-monetary contribution to the 
marital unit.211 In most cases where women have shown non-monetary 
contribution to marital property, courts have undervalued their 
worth.212 For example, in P.A.W.M. v. C.W.A.W.M. (2018), the court 
rejected an application to share a property worth $600,000 equally.213
The court awarded the woman $30,000 for her non-monetary contribu-
tion.214 Similarly, in M.A.A. v. A.R. (2018), which involved a marriage 
of 36 years, the court held as follows:
[W]here the contribution is non-monetary, the situation be-
comes difficult. The court has to estimate the efforts by the 
spouse who did not make any financial contribution and give 
it a value, either as a percentage or as a lump sum. I do assess 
Constitution calls for an equal distribution of all property acquired during the mar-
riage).
209. P.W.K. v. J.K.G. (2015) Civil Appeal No. 33 of 2014, e.K.L.R. (C.A.K.) (Kenya) 
(quoting Echaria v. Echaria (2007) Civil Case 663 of 2007, e.K.L.R. (C.A.K.) (Ken-
ya)).
210. The Matrimonial Property Act, No. 49 § 2 (2013) (Kenya).
211. The Matrimonial Property Act, No. 49 § 2 (2013) (Kenya).
212. F.S. v. E.Z. (2016) Matrimonial Cause No. 16 of 2014, e.K.L.R. (H.C.K.) (Kenya); 
U.M.M. v. I.M.M. (2014) Civil Suit No. 39 of 2012, e.K.L.R. (H.C.K.) (Kenya).
213. P.A.W.M. v. C.M.A.W.M. (2018) Civil Appeal No. 104 of 2016, e.K.L.R. (C.A.K.) 
(Kenya).
214. P.A.W.M. v. C.M.A.W.M. (2018) Civil Appeal No. 104 of 2016, e.K.L.R.
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the [wife’s] contribution towards Plot No. 37 to be 30%. 
The [wife] is entitled to 30% of the property.215
In both cases, the women showed their non-monetary contribution, but 
the courts still undervalued it. In resolving such disputes, some courts 
have stated that each party should walk away with what they deserve,216
while other courts have stated that spousal contribution determines the 
claim to marital property.217 The state of the law in the courts is thus 
unclear.
B. Judicial Decisions on the Weight of Uncompensated Domestic Work 
Pre-2010: Contribution as the Basis for Marital Property Division
In a number of marital property disputes, the courts gave the wife 
almost an equal share to that of the husband.218 The precedent set by the 
Court of Appeal in Kivuitu v. Kivuitu (1991) recognized a wife’s 
indirect contribution to the household unit.219 From 1991 to 2006, the 
courts followed the Kivuitu v. Kivuitu decision.220 In that case, the 
parties’ marriage lasted for more than 20 years.221 The husband argued 
that he solely contributed to the acquisition of marital property and that 
the wife was not entitled to a share.222 However, the court held that the 
wife made indirect contributions and, as such, she was entitled to 50
percent.223 Similarly, the court in Muthembwa v. Muthembwa (2001) 
adopted the same holding and recognized the woman’s non-monetary 
contribution to the marital estate.224
215. M.A.A. v. A.R. (2018) Matrimonial Cause No. 1 of 2017, e.K.L.R. (H.C.K.) (Ken-
ya).
216. F.S., Matrimonial Cause No. 16 of 2014, e.K.L.R. 
217. U.M.M., Civil Suit No. 39 of 2012, e.K.L.R.
218. See Nderitu v. Kariuki (1998) Civil Appeal 203 of 1997, e.K.L.R. (C.A.K.) (Kenya); 
Muthembwa v. Muthembwa (2002) 1 E.A. 186 (C.A.K.) (Kenya); D.M.M. v. 
M.N.M. (2001) Civil Appeal 236 of 2001, e.K.L.R. (C.A.K.) (Kenya). These cases 
involved disputes between husband and wife over beneficial interest in the property 
acquired during marriage. In the each of the cases, the wife had to prove contribu-
tions towards the acquisition of property.
219. Kivuitu v. Kivuitu (1991) Civil Appeal No. 26 of 1985, K.L.R. 6, 7 (C.A.K.) (Ken-
ya).
220. See generally Kivuitu, Civil Appeal No. 26 of 1985, K.L.R.
221. Kivuitu, Civil Appeal No. 26 of 1985, K.L.R., at 255.
222. Kivuitu, Civil Appeal No. 26 of 1985, K.L.R., at 261.
223. See Kivuitu, Civil Appeal No. 26 of 1985, K.L.R., at 258.
224. Muthembwa v. Muthembwa (2002) 1 E.A. 186, 194 (C.A.K.) (Kenya).
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In contrast, the trial court in Nderitu v. Nderitu (1997) overlooked 
the Court of Appeal Kivuitu decision. The court determined that the 
wife, who claimed non-monetary contribution, was entitled to only 30
percent of the marital property.225 Additionally, the judge declined to 
award the woman 50 percent of the property due to her incapacity after 
childbirth, stating, “[T]here is . . . evidence that the caesarian deliveries 
reduced for those periods she was delivering, her capacity to exert herself 
in any gainful activity . . . . I take note of the delivery condition and 
award the wife thirty percent.”226 Here, the lower court viewed the dis-
pute through the lens of a traditional marriage theory.227 In an ideal ap-
proach, free of biased, traditional values, the court would have consid-
ered the wife’s life-threatening risk as an extraordinary contribution. 
Instead, the trial court failed to consider women’s unpaid work as work
by devaluing the woman’s non-monetary contribution.228
Then the Court of Appeal reversed the lower court’s decision here 
and granted the husband and wife each 50 percent of the marital prop-
erty.229 The Court of Appeal noted that the wife’s contribution amount-
ed to an indirect contribution that allowed the marital estate to grow.230
In 2007, Echaria v. Echaria reversed the weight accorded to wom-
en’s uncompensated domestic work.231 In that case, the parties’ marriage 
lasted for more than 30 years, and they accumulated a vast marital es-
tate.232 In settling the marital dispute, the Court of Appeal awarded the 
wife, who had provided non-monetary contribution, but had limited 
proof of such contribution, only 25 percent of the property. 233
From 2007 through 2010 (when Kenya adopted its new constitu-
tion), the Echaria decision bound the lower courts in Kenya.234 The 
Echaria standard required proof of non-monetary contribution as the 
basis for spousal contribution.235 At the time the case was decided, Ken-
yan law did not recognize non-monetary contribution to marital assets.
225. Nderitu v. Nderitu (1998), Civil Appeal 203 of 1997, e.K.L.R. (C.A.K.) (Kenya).
226. Nderitu, Civil Appeal 203 of 1997, e.K.L.R.
227. See Nderitu, Civil Appeal 203 of 1997, e.K.L.R.
228. See Nderitu, Civil Appeal 203 of 1997, e.K.L.R.
229. Nderitu v. Nderitu (1998), Civil Appeal 203 of 1997, e.K.L.R.
230. Nderitu, Civil Appeal 203 of 1997, e.K.L.R.
231. See Echaria v. Echaria (2007) Civil Appeal No. 75 of 2001, e.K.L.R. (C.A.K.) (Ken-
ya).
232. Echaria, Civil Appeal No. 75 of 2001, e.K.L.R.
233. Echaria, Civil Appeal No. 75 of 2001, e.K.L.R.
234. In 2010, Kenya promulgated a new Constitution that provided for the rights of par-
ties within a marriage. Specifically, the courts relied on Article 45 of the Constitution 
on the principle of equality in marriage. See Baraza, supra note 10, at 9.
235. See Echaria, Civil Appeal No. 75 of 2001, e.K.L.R.
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C. Judicial Decisions on the Weight of Uncompensated Domestic Work 
Post-2010: Statutory Recognition of Non-Monetary Contribution
In practice some courts have held that Section 7 of the MPA ex-
pands on the Echaria standard as to what constitutes spousal contribu-
tion.236
A review of recent decisions from the courts indicates the emer-
gence of two schools of thought in determining the weight attached to 
uncompensated domestic work during property division on divorce.
The leading school of thought rejects the equality of spousal contribu-
tion, while the other lauds the equality of non-monetary contribution. 
In rejecting equality of spousal contribution, most courts have deter-
mined that monetary contribution weighs heavier than non-monetary 
contribution, therefore ruling in favor of the husbands. In contrast, very 
few court decisions have held that non-monetary contributions allowed
for an equal split of the marital estate upon divorce.
Most judicial decisions post-2010 have disregarded the equality of 
spousal contribution. For example, the court in U.M.M. v. I.M.M.
(2014) rejected the equal distribution of marital property under Article 
45 of the Constitution.237 While analyzing Section 7 of the MPA, the 
court noted that proof of non-monetary contribution could entitle the 
proving spouse to 50 percent of the marital property.238 In the course of 
their 17-year marriage, the husband and wife acquired six properties.239
The wife sought an equal share of the marital property on divorce.240 In 
making the determination, the court recognized that the wife made 
non-monetary contributions to the acquisition of the marital proper-
ty.241 However, the court rejected the wife’s non-monetary contribution 
to one of the properties when she failed to provide evidence to support 
her financial contribution to the property.242
236. P.N.N. v. Z.W.N. (2017), Civil Appeal No. 128 of 2014, e.K.L.R. (C.A.K.) (Ken-
ya).
237. U.M.M. v. I.M.M. (2014) Civil Suit No. 39 of 2012, e.K.L.R. (H.C.K.) (Kenya) 
(stating that it would be “oppressive” to the contributing spouse for the non-
contributing spouse to receive 50 percent of the marital property on divorce and 
therefore “cannot be the sense of equality contemplated by Article 45(3)”).
238. U.M.M., Civil Suit No. 39 of 2012, e.K.L.R.
239. U.M.M., Civil Suit No. 39 of 2012, e.K.L.R.
240. See U.M.M., Civil Suit No. 39 of 2012, e.K.L.R.
241. U.M.M., Civil Suit No. 39 of 2012, e.K.L.R.
242. U.M.M., Civil Suit No. 39 of 2012, e.K.L.R.
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This shows that even when women plead non-monetary contribu-
tion, they must provide documentary evidence of such work.243 This is 
reminiscent of Echaria, which courts followed until the adoption of the 
2010 Constitution.244 It is hard to provide documentary evidence of 
grocery shopping undertaken in a period spanning decades.245 People do 
not wed planning to provide evidence in their divorce case; therefore, 
most women undertaking such work do not keep track of all the receipts 
or documents that could prove their contribution.246 Additionally, even 
when women provide such evidence, the courts fail to equalize non-
monetary contribution with monetary contribution. According to advo-
cates, the patriarchal attitudes and breadwinner mentality prohibit 
courts from fully realizing the equality of spousal contribution.247
Similar to U.M.M. v. I.M.M., the court in M.A.A. v. A.R. (2018)
acknowledged the non-monetary contribution of the wife in a 36-year 
marriage, but ruled in favor of the husband’s monetary contribution,
assessing the wife’s contribution to be only 30 percent.248 Additionally,
in rejecting the wife’s non-monetary contribution in a marriage of 14
years, the court in A.W.N. v. F.M.N. (2018), stated: “She does not show 
her involvement in domestic work and management of the matrimonial 
home. Neither has she given evidence of the companionship she gave to 
the defendant. There is no evidence of her involvement in management 
of family business or property.”249
243. Odhiambo & Oduor, supra note 8, at 10–11; See also Kivuitu v. Kivuitu (1991) Civil 
Appeal No. 26 of 1985, K.L.R. 248 (C.A.K.) (Kenya).
244. See Echaria v. Echaria (2007) Civil Appeal No. 75 of 2001, e.K.L.R. (C.A.K.) (Ken-
ya) (holding that a spouse seeking non-monetary contribution must prove such con-
tribution).
245. See generally Odhiambo & Oduor, supra note 8, at 12.
246. M.G.N.K. v. A.W.G. (2016), Civil Appeal No. 208 of 2012, e.K.L.R. (C.A.K.) 
(Kenya). The court stated that it would be impossible for any married couple to keep 
track of documents and records of every contribution made. This is because at the 
time of marriage and during marriage, divorce is not on the horizon.
247. See generally Odhiambo & Oduor, supra note 8, at 12–13.
248. M.A.A. v. A.R. (2018) Matrimonial Cause No. 1 of 2017, e.K.L.R. (H.C.K.) (Ken-
ya); see also P.A.W.M. v. C.W.A.W.M. (2018), Civil Appeal No. 104 of 2016, 
e.K.L.R. (C.A.K.) (Kenya) (further illustrating the conflicting decisions, awarding the 
wife a meager $30,000 for her non-monetary contribution to matrimonial property 
valued at $600,000).
249. A.W.N. v. F.M.N. (2018) Matrimonial Cause No. 10 of 2016, e.K.L.R. (H.C.K.) 
(Kenya). Further, in S.A.O. v. F.O.M., in rejecting the wife’s contribution in a mar-
riage of 15 years, the court established that out of three matrimonial properties, the 
wife could only share equally in just one of the properties. S.A.O. v. F.O.M. (2018) 
Civil Suit No. 1 of 2016, e.K.L.R. (H.C.K.) (Kenya).
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Some courts have also allowed spouses to transfer marital assets to 
limited liability companies to deprive the other spouse from accessing 
the property on divorce.250 For example, the lower court in P.W.K. v. 
J.K.G. (2015) disregarded the wife’s contribution in dividing marital
property.251 In the course of their 34-year union, the parties had accu-
mulated 18 properties.252 In an attempt to keep the properties for him-
self, the husband transferred most of them to a limited company, a law-
yer, and relatives as gifts.253 The husband argued that the wife’s 
contribution was minimal as she used the money to buy cosmetics and 
clothes.254 The trial court held that the company did not constitute mar-
ital property.255 The court directed that parties were not to share equally 
in the remaining property, either.256
However, the Court of Appeal rejected the trial court’s analysis, 
holding that marital property placed in the name of a company forms 
part of the marital assets.257 Typically, under the principle of 
distinctions, company property is separate from marital property; 
however, the court determined that marital property placed in the 
company became altered, such that typical company law distinctions 
were inapplicable.258 The Court of Appeal intervened in the injustice 
perpetuated by the patriarchal approach of the lower court and reversed 
the holding.259 Similarly, in the case of M.S.K. v. S.N.K. (2015), the 
court refused to be bound by the company form where the husband had 
250. See, e.g., P.W.K. v. J.K.G. (2015) Civil Appeal No. 33 of 2014, e.K.L.R. (C.A.K.) 
(Kenya).
251. P.W.K., Civil Appeal No. 33 of 2014, e.K.L.R.
252. P.W.K., Civil Appeal No. 33 of 2014, e.K.L.R.
253. See P.W.K., Civil Appeal No. 33 of 2014, e.K.L.R.
254. P.W.K., Civil Appeal No. 33 of 2014, e.K.L.R.
255. P.W.K., Civil Appeal No. 33 of 2014, e.K.L.R.
256. P.W.K., Civil Appeal No. 33 of 2014, e.K.L.R.
257. P.W.K., Civil Appeal No. 33 of 2014, e.K.L.R.
258. P.W.K., Civil Appeal No. 33 of 2014, e.K.L.R.
259. P.W.K., Civil Appeal No. 33 of 2014, e.K.L.R. The Court stated: “We observe at the 
outset that the learned Judge appears to have addressed the matter before him in a 
rather casual manner and does not appear to have gone into the kind of analysis that 
would have been called for in a matter as contested as the one before him . . . . We 
have perused the various exhibits that evidence that transaction and are left in no 
doubt whatsoever that the half share belonged to the appellant absolutely. The 
upshot of our consideration of this appeal is that it succeeds. We think that had the 
learned Judge gone into a closer analysis of the viva voce and documentary evidence 
placed before him and also considered the various authorities on the subject, he 
would in all likelihood have arrived at a different conclusion.” Id.
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transferred ownership of marital property to a limited company in order 
to hide assets from his wife during their divorce proceedings.260
These trends demonstrate that courts are reluctant to adopt a part-
nership approach to marriage when dividing marital property on di-
vorce. Many courts in Kenya have determined that, in interpreting the 
principle of equality in marriage, the partnership approach may arise in 
different aspects of marriage, such as decision-making, but not spousal 
contribution.261 A concurring judge in P.N.N. v. Z.W.N. (2017) stated, 
“The reality remains that when the ship of marriage hits the 
rocks . . . business of division and distribution of matrimonial property 
must be proceeded with on the basis of fairness and conscience, not a 
romantic clutching on to the 50:50 mantra.”262 Thus, for the Court of 
Appeal, marital property division is not a system of distributing the 
property; rather, it is a process of determining who owns the property.263
The Kenyan system thus represents a discretionary distribution ap-
proach, rather than the equitable distribution approach dictated by the 
partnership model. The approach taken by the Court of Appeal betrays 
the values of joint spousal contribution and equality. While Article 45 
of the Constitution guarantees spousal equality, courts have made deci-
sions inconsistent with this principle.264
In contrast, at times, the courts have recognized the equality of 
spousal contribution. For example, the court in M.W.G. v. T.K.G.
(2015) took a different approach than most. The court held that the 
weight of the homemaker contribution was equivalent to financial con-
tribution.265 The court relied on Article 45 of the Constitution and Sec-
260. See M.S.K. v. S.N.K. (2005) Divorce Cause 6 of 1997, e.K.L.R. (H.C.K.) (Kenya).
261. P.N.N. v. Z.W.N. (2017) Civil Appeal No. 128 of 2014, e.K.L.R. (C.A.K.) (Kenya).
262. P.N.N., Civil Appeal No. 128 of 2014, e.K.L.R.
263. P.N.N., Civil Appeal No. 128 of 2014, e.K.L.R.
264. See F.S. v. E.Z. (2016) Matrimonial Cause No. 16 of 2014, e.K.L.R. (H.C.K.) (Ken-
ya) (arguing that Article 45 of the Constitution does not call for an equal share of 
matrimonial property and determining that the bigger the monetary contribution, 
the bigger the entitlement); U.M.M. v. I.M.M. (2014) Civil Suit No. 39 of 2012, 
e.K.L.R. (H.C.K.) (Kenya) (arguing that Article 45 does not confer an automatic 
50:50 share of matrimonial property and disregarding the woman’s non-monetary 
contribution based on a technicality); M.W.M. v. H.M.M. (2017) Civil Suit No. 75 
of 2014, e.K.L.R. (H.C.K.) (Kenya) (explaining that Article 45 forms the basis of di-
vision of matrimonial property in cases where the court cannot determine the evi-
dence of actual contribution); M.W.G. v. T.K.G. (2016) Civil Case No. 15 of 2014, 
e.K.L.R. (H.C.K.) (Kenya) (explaining that it would be impossible to attach any val-
ue to non-monetary contributions such as companionship, parental child care, and 
management of a matrimonial home because “these tasks are simply priceless.”).
265. M.W.G., Civil Case No. 15 of 2014, e.K.L.R.
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tion 7 of the MPA.266 The couple’s marriage lasted close to 28 years, and 
the wife sought an equal share of marital properties.267 In determining 
spousal contribution, the court noted that Section 7 of the MPA did not 
provide for monetary assessment of uncompensated domestic work.268
Nonetheless, the court relied on the Constitution and recognized equal 
spousal rights to marital property.269 Similarly, in upholding equality of 
spousal contribution, the court in M.B.O. v. J.O.O. (2018) held that the 
wife deserved half of the marital properties for her contribution.270 The 
decisions in these cases displayed a strong deference to women’s un-
compensated domestic work and attached equal importance to both 
monetary and non-monetary contribution.271
D. The Underlying Influences of the Court’s Approach
Out of more than 15 sample cases post-2010, only two cases 
recognized the equal weight of non-monetary and monetary 
contribution.272 Looking at the recent decisions and the differing schools 
of thought on the weight of non-monetary contribution, it shows that 
economic theories of marriage, private values, and biases have 
influenced most decisions on property division. For example, the 
decisions in F.S. v. E.Z., U.M.M. v. I.M.M., S.A.O. v. F.O.M., and 
M.A.A. v. I.R. point to courts’ general attitude on the weight of non-
monetary contribution.273 These cases are evidence of the existing 
loopholes in Kenya’s matrimonial property law. In dividing matrimonial 
266. M.W.G., Civil Case No. 15 of 2014, e.K.L.R.
267. M.W.G., Civil Case No. 15 of 2014, e.K.L.R.
268. M.W.G., Civil Case No. 15 of 2014, e.K.L.R.
269. M.W.G., Civil Case No. 15 of 2014, e.K.L.R.
270. M.B.O. v. J.O.O. (2018) Civil Appeal No. 81 of 2017, e.K.L.R. (C.A.K.) (Kenya).
271. M.W.G., Civil Case No. 15 of 2014, e.K.L.R.
272. See M.W.G. v. T.K.G. (2015) Civil Case No. 15 of 2014, e.K.L.R. (H.C.K.) (Ken-
ya); M.W.G. v. W.P.G. (2016) H.C.C.C. No. 50 of 2011, e.K.L.R. (H.C.K.) (Ken-
ya).
273. M.A.A. v. A.R. (2018) Matrimonial Cause No. 1 of 2017, e.K.L.R. (H.C.K.) (Ken-
ya) (finding plaintiff’s efforts in taking care of mother-in-law relevant to disposition 
of property); S.A.O. v. F.O.M. (2018) Civil Suit No. 1 of 2016, e.K.L.R. (H.C.K.)
(Kenya) (recognizing child care and care of the marital home as non-monetary con-
tributions to the acquisition of property); F.S. v. E.Z. (2016) Matrimonial Cause No. 
16 of 2014, e.K.L.R. (H.C.K.) (Kenya) (taking into account applicant spouse’s work 
in overseeing the purchase of property when distributing the property after divorce); 
U.M.M. v. I.M.M. (2014) Civil Suit No. 39 of 2012, e.K.L.R. (H.C.K.) (Kenya) 
(recognizing non-monetary contributions of spouse towards development of shared 
property).
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property, the MPA only explicitly provides for the fact of contribution 
(both monetary and non-monetary).274 It does tell courts which factors 
to assess—such as the duration of marriage, custodial parent, or unfair 
transfer of property—to make these determinations. Altogether, 
consideration of such factors could help courts reach equitable and fair 
decisions. 
As a result, courts in Kenya must grapple with the weight to afford
non-monetary contribution. Some of the courts state that the home-
maker contribution is priceless, while others state that it is not quantifi-
able, and therefore it is assessed on a lower scale.275 Additionally, this 
leaves potential litigants in a state of confusion.276 The end result is that 
the vague approach of spousal contribution under the MPA and the 
subjective interpretation of Article 45 of the Constitution by the courts
strongly undermine the principle of spousal equality.
V.  Guides for Marital Property Law Reform
Marital property distribution systems are highly divergent around 
the world. The United States has multiple schemes for property divi-
sion.277 Most countries within the European Union have a scheme of 
property division with deferred property being the most common, espe-
cially those in the Scandinavian region, such as Denmark, Iceland, Swe-
den, Norway, and Finland.278 Such a regime ensures the protection of 
the economically dependent spouse.279 In Scandinavian countries, 
spouses have separate property during marriage, but an equal division 
takes place upon divorce.280 In this Section, I first explore different re-
gimes of property division in the United States; then I examine the 
Scandinavian model of property division; and lastly, I propose further 
274. The Matrimonial Property Act, No. 49 § 2 (2013) (Kenya).
275. See, e.g., Echaria v. Echaria (2007) Civil Suit No. 663 of 2007, e.K.L.R. (H.C.K.) 
(Kenya), (awarding a diplomat’s wife, after over 30 years of marriage, only 25 percent 
of the marital estate, despite the fact that she could not work while her husband was a 
diplomat).
276. Compare F.S. v. E.Z. (2016) Matrimonial Cause No. 16 of 2014, e.K.L.R. (H.C.K.) 
(Kenya) (rejecting the equality of spousal contribution), with M.W.G. v. T.K.
(2015), Civil Case No. 15 of 2014, e.K.L.R. (H.C.K.) (Kenya) (upholding the equal-
ity of spousal contribution).
277. How Do Judges Decide, supra note 200, at 410.
278. Branka Rešetar, Matrimonial Property in Europe: A Link Between Sociology and Family 
Law, 12.3 ELECTRONIC J. COMP. L., 1, 4–5 (2008).
279. Id. at 1.
280. Id. at 4.
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legislative action for added regulations to Kenya’s matrimonial property 
law.
A. Marital Property Division in the United States
Because of the varied property division systems in the United 
States, spouses might receive different property awards depending on 
the jurisdiction.281 The United States does not have a consolidated re-
gime on division of marital property. Each of the 50 States has a unique 
marital property regime.282 From New York to California to South Da-
kota, state statutes grant courts nearly unlimited discretion in divorce 
cases.283 Currently, seven states mandate equal division of marital prop-
erty or have adopted a presumption in favor of equal division.284 The 
remaining 43 dictate equitable division.285 The equitable division in the 
43 states is usually based on a lengthy factor list, such as duration of 
marriage, contribution of each party, custody of children, wasteful dissi-
pation of marital assets, encumbrances on marital property, economic 
circumstance of each spouse, age and health of the parties, reasonable 
opportunity for future acquisition of capital assets and income, and loss 
of career opportunities, among others.286
At times, trial courts experience difficulties based on the multifac-
tor lists considered during property division.287 The trial court has the 
challenging task of “quantifying the value of the supporting spouse’s 
and [economically dependent] spouse’s contributions to the marriage 
and determining the rights and responsibilities of parties on divorce.”288
Still, most states grant trial courts discretionary authority to deal with 
issues surrounding property division.289 In most American jurisdictions, 
the courts evaluate each party’s past conduct, present needs, and future 
needs.290 On alimony, 45 states provide statutory factors for the courts 
281. Marsha Garrison, The Economic Consequences of Divorce: Would Adoption of the ALI 
Principles Improve Current Outcomes?, 8 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 119, 120
(2001) [hereinafter The Economic Consequences].
282. Id.
283. How Do Judges Decide, supra note 200, at 409.
284. Id. at 410–11.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Morris, supra note 5, at 82.
288. Jane C. Murphy, Eroding the Myth of Discretionary Justice in Family Law: The Child 
Support Experiment, 70 N.C. L. REV. 209, 217 (1991).
289. Morris, supra note 5, at 82.
290. How Do Judges Decide, supra note 200, at 410.
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to consider.291 The remaining states adopted statutory formulas in ali-
mony determinations.292
In the United States, judicial decisions adopt different models of 
property division. The models include equitable distribution, equal dis-
tribution, and states that have adopted a presumption toward equal dis-
tribution.293 Depending on the state jurisdiction, courts assess the de-
pendent spouse’s role as homemaker and caretaker as supporting the 
independent spouse to accumulate the material wealth.294 In In re Mar-
riage of Polsky,295 an Illinois court divided a $368 million estate in half,
noting that the wife’s contributions as homemaker and mother allowed
the husband to accumulate the marital assets.296 On appeal, the Illinois 
Court of Appeals stated that “the award constituted a just division of the 
marital property that adequately reflected the relevant statutory factors, 
including the relative contributions of each party to the acquisition, 
preservation, or increase in the value of the marital property and the du-
ration of the marriage.”297 The court acknowledged the role of the wife 
as a homemaker and primary caregiver of the couple’s two children dur-
ing the couple’s 30-year marriage.298
Likewise, in Adams v. Adams (2011), a Massachusetts court divided 
an $80 million marital estate equally following a 12-year marriage.299
Unlike Kenya’s approach, the court ruled that the wife’s contributions 
as homemaker and primary caregiver for the parties’ young children 
meant that an equal division of the estate was the most equitable of pos-
sible divisions.300
However, homemaker contributions do not always result in an 
equal division of the marital estate.301 In marital estates running into 
millions of dollars, some courts like in Mathews v. Mathews (1998) and 
Fonzi v. Fonzi (1993) observed that the non-monetary contribution has 
to be extraordinary.302 In cases of millions of dollars where the contribu-
291. Morris, supra note 5, at 83.
292. Id.
293. How Do Judges Decide, supra note 200, at 424 n.87.
294. David N. Hofstein et al., Equitable Distribution Involving Large Marital Estates, 26 J.
AM. ACAD. MATRIM. L. 311, 320 (2014).
295. In re Marriage of Polsky, 899 N.E.2d 454 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008).
296. Hofstein, supra note 294, at 320.
297. In re Marriage of Polsky, 899 N.E.2d at 469.
298. In re Marriage of Polsky, 899 N.E.2d at 464.
299. See Adams v. Adams, 945 N.E.2d 844 (Mass. 2011).
300. Adams, 945 N.E.2d at 871.
301. Hofstein, supra note 294, at 320.
302. See Mathews v. Mathews, 496 S.E.2d 126 (Va. Ct. App. 1998). The court ruled that 
it was Mrs. Mathews’ hard work that in part formed the basis of the husband’s suc-
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tion is not extraordinary, the courts do not deprive the homemaker 
spouse the accustomed standard of living.303 In both cases, the courts di-
vided the marital estate worth millions of dollars equally between the 
husband and wife.304
1.  Equitable Distribution
The equitable distribution approach to property distribution relies 
heavily on judicial discretion to achieve a fair outcome.305 Equitable dis-
tribution states grant trial courts the capacity to award a spouse any por-
tion of the pool of distributable marital assets.306 For example, New
York’s statutory scheme requires the court to distribute assets equitably 
between the parties, considering the circumstances of the case and of the 
respective parties.307 Equity is to be determined based on judicial con-
sideration of 12 statutory factors.308 The legislation also views marriage 
as an economic partnership.309 The New York Domestic Relations Law 
defines marital property as:
All property acquired by either or both spouses during the 
marriage and before the execution of a separation agreement 
or the commencement of a matrimonial action, regardless of 
the form in which title is held, except as otherwise provided 
cess in later years. Id. at 127. The trial court agreed, awarding the wife nearly fifty 
percent of the marital estate of over 50 million dollars. Id. at 128; see also Fonzi v. 
Fonzi, 633 A.2d 634 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993). The court noted the wife’s significant 
contributions as both a corporate spouse and a homemaker. Id. In analyzing the 
wife’s homemaker contributions, the court noted that, while the husband worked 
hard to develop and succeed at his own business during the 30-year marriage, the 
wife raised four children virtually alone, including one daughter who died at age 16.
Id. The trial court divided the 3.8 million dollar estate equally between the parties.
Id.; see also Avramis v. Avramis, 664 N.Y.S.2d 885 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997). There, in 
a nine million dollar estate, the trial court awarded the wife four million dollars. Id.
The court noted the wife’s active role in managing the, parties’ real estate holdings, 
making offers on parcels, attending closings, executing notes and mortgages, renting 
apartments, collecting security deposits and rents and maintaining the books. Id. Da-
vid N. Hofstein et al. concludes that the dependent spouse’s contribution has to be 
extraordinary in large marital estates. See Hofstein, supra note 294, at 320.
303. Hofstein, supra note 294, at 321.
304. See Matthews, 496 S.E.2d at 126; Fonzi, 633 A.2d at 634.
305. How Do Judges Decide, supra note 200, at 452–55.
306. Id.
307. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236(B)(5)(c) (McKinney 2016).
308. How Do Judges Decide, supra note 200, at 410.
309. Id. at 427.
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in agreement pursuant to subdivision three of this part. 
Marital property shall not include separate property as 
hereinafter defined.310
Although the New York Court of Appeals (New York’s highest 
court) has expansively defined marital property to include a professional 
degree or license, it has ruled that the homemaking contribution does 
not call for an equal share of marital assets as in the case of Arvantides v. 
Arvantides (1985).311 In that case, the court upheld a reduction of the 
wife’s share of the husband’s dental practice from 50 percent to 25 per-
cent.312
In the case of O’Brien v. O’Brien (1985), the New York Court of 
Appeals defined matrimonial property to include a professional degree 
acquired during marriage.313 Some states, such as South Dakota, provide 
that all property be subject for division, including the spouses’ retire-
ment plans.314 In some instances, “[b]ased on a multifactor analysis, an 
equitable division of property will not always result in a fifty-fifty 
split.”315 The equitable distribution applies a modern divorce outlook to 
marital property division. In effect, the approach allays the fears of the 
opponents of the equitable approach. The courts may be guided by ad-
ditional statutory factors such as duration of marriage, custody of chil-
dren, and loss of economic opportunities to achieve fair divorce out-
comes.
2.  Equal Distribution
In the United States, only seven states currently employ an equal 
division or presumption-of-equal-division approach. California is one 
such state.316 California adopted an equal marital property division rule 
moving from an equitable distribution regime.317
Scholars have stated that “[e]qual division offers a rough compro-
mise between the competing claims of contribution and need.”318 For 
310. N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 236(B)(1)(c).
311. See Arvantides v. Arvantides, 478 N.E.2d 199, 200 (N.Y. 1985).
312. Arvantides, 478 N.E.2d at 200.
313. O’Brien v. O’Brien, 489 N.E.2d 712, 713 (N.Y. 1985).
314. Morris, supra note 5, at 86.
315. Id. at 87.
316. How Do Judges Decide, supra note 200, at 410.
317. See Marsha Garrison, What’s Fair in Divorce Property Distribution: Cross-National Per-
spectives from Survey Evidence, 72 LA. L. REV. 57, 70 (2011) [hereinafter What’s Fair].
318. The Economic Consequences of Divorce, supra note 281, at 124.
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the most part, the rule awards more financial compensation as opposed 
to a need-based award.319 “The equal-division rule typically provides 
[the homemaker spouse] more than he or she contributed financially, 
but less than a need-based rule might provide, depending upon the def-
inition of need.”320 Only seven states have adopted the approach, which 
suggests that it remains a relatively unpopular rule of property division.
3. The American Law Institute Principles
In Kenya, judicial decisions on marital property are highly unpre-
dictable and inconsistent. In the United States, the American Law Insti-
tute (“ALI”) attempted family law reform because of the unpredictabil-
ity of court decisions due to wide judicial discretion.321 The ALI 
Principles propose interstate uniformity to determine the economic con-
sequences of divorce. Additionally, the Principles call for a limited at-
tempt on reigning in judicial discretion. Widely acclaimed scholar and 
former Harvard Law Professor David Westfall has highlighted the Prin-
ciples’ inconsistency, inaccurate assumptions, and incomplete treatment 
of economic and business matters.322 Most states have judicial standards 
that establish an equal division as an analytical starting point.
Several approaches to marriage are important in examining the ALI 
Principles. The partnership approach proposes a combination of the 
marital model and universal model.323 The marital model resembles a 
separate property scheme excluding assets acquired before marriage and 
gifts and inheritance received during marriage.324 The universal model 
calls for the division of all assets acquired and owned by either spouse,
regardless of method of acquiring.325 The ALI Principles add a varying 
percentage of non-marital assets to the pool of distributable marital 
assets during the marriage.326 Thus, at the beginning of a marriage, “the 
ALI approach requires use of the marital model, while in a long 
319. See What’s Fair, supra note 317, at 70.
320. Id.
321. See Westfall, supra note 87, at 920.
322. See id. at 924–25 (stating that the Principles “are internally inconsistent, at times to 
the point of incoherence; they rely on the comforting but inaccurate assumption that 
no-fault divorce is freely available to spouses everywhere; and the treatment of busi-
ness and economic matters and income tax considerations is surprisingly uninformed 
and incomplete”).
323. See What’s Fair, supra note 317, at 66; Parkinson, supra note 119, at 11.
324. What’s Fair, supra note 317, at 66.
325. Id.
326. Id. at 61.
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marriage it requires use of the universal approach.”327 Because of the 
unfair decisions on long-term marriages, a universal model approach can 
remedy the injustice faced by women in such marriages in Kenya. The 
universal model presupposes that in a long-term marriage, a court can 
divide property without regard to the mode and time of acquisition.328
“Although no state has adopted the ALI proposal, there are a number of 
jurisdictions that authorize a court to divide some or all non-marital 
assets in special circumstances.”329 Today, spousal relations display an 
equality ideal. The principle of equality in marriage represents a 
partnership that promotes an equal spousal role in household decision-
making and organization.330
4. The American Academy of Matrimonial Property Lawyers 
Guidelines
In determining alimony awards, the American Academy of Matri-
monial Property Lawyers (“AAML”) rejected the proposed ALI Princi-
ples.331 The AAML “offered another model” and cautioned “against the 
formulaic model by referring to numerous factors.”332 Since most states 
considered the factors of “income of the parties” and the “length of the 
marriage” during alimony, the AAML proposed a formula to calculate a
suggested amount of alimony.333 The AAML formula calculates “30% of 
the payor’s gross income minus 20% of the payee’s gross income.”334
The formulaic amount should not exceed 40 percent of the parties’
combined gross income.335 This formula only considers the incomes of 
the parties, not the duration of the marriage.336
327. Id.
328. See id. at 60.
329. Id. at 61. Despite their shortcomings, the ALI Principles propose factors useful in 
valuing the homemaker contribution. Courts in Kenya that grapple with the value of 
the homemaker contribution could borrow from the factors enumerated by the ALI 
Principles. See Westfall, supra note 87, at 920.
330. What’s Fair, supra note 317, at 66.
331. Morris, supra note 5, at 94.
332. Id.
333. Marshal S. Willick, A Universal Approach to Alimony: How Alimony Should Be Calcu-
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The AAML has proposed additional factors such as duration of 
marriage, age of parties, financial needs, and spousal contribution.337
Looking at the equitable distribution approach in New York, the courts 
use statutory factors similar to proposed AAML factors to divide marital 
assets.338
B. The Scandinavian Model of Marital Property Division
The Scandinavian model of marital economy is based on the idea 
of “deferred community.”339 Deferred community is defined as property
acquired by the spouses after their marriage, whether individually or to-
gether, and forms part of the community property.340 The definition 
provides an exception of personal property and property which falls into 
the deferred community of property.341
Scandinavian law recognizes a no-fault divorce as well as post-
divorce consequences.342 Marriage reform in Scandinavian countries pre-
sents a modified dual breadwinner model.343 A spouse’s contribution 
through unpaid work is recognized as family support and therefore 
equal to the other spouse’s economic contribution.344 As a rule, the mar-
ital property regime adopts an equal distribution between the parties.345
Under Norwegian law, the rule of unequal division is only a general 
principle, which may be set aside if it leads to an obviously unfair re-
sult.346 Under the marital regime, a wife’s indirect contribution, in the 
form of uncompensated domestic work, achieves the sufficiency of co-
ownership of a house purchased by the husband.347
Danish law determines the deferred community under equal 
property division.348 The exception to the rule arises during short 
duration marriages where an equal division would be unjust.349 Where 
337. Id. at 197–98.
338. Morris, supra note 5, at 95.
339. Kari Melby et al., The Scandinavian Model of Marriage, 15 WOMEN’S HIST. REV.
651, 654 (2006).
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partners own property separately and in special circumstances, the court 
has the option to take into consideration the duration of the marriage 
and the economic circumstances of the spouses. The court will also take 
into account the economically challenged spouse’s need to obtain a 
different residence and any direct or indirect contribution made towards 
acquiring the property.350
The presumption of indirect contribution advances the equality of 
spouses with regard to the economic consequences of the marriage.351
The systems equalize the value of indirect and direct contributions while 
correcting the de facto inequality between spouses.352 Like in Norway, 
the Constitution of Kenya provides for the principle of equality in mar-
riage.353 The Constitution sought to correct the de facto inequality be-
tween spouses.354 The equalizing value of spousal contributions to mari-
tal assets remains the common element in most European marital prop-
property regimes.355
In Sweden, once parties marry, each spouse’s property becomes 
part of the marital property forming a part of the deferred community 
property regime.356 “The Swedish Marriage Code states that each 
spouse’s property will become marital property, which means that each 
spouse will continue to ‘alone own all of his or property’ and ‘adminis-
ter it alone.’” 357 However, “the system gives each spouse a special claim 
called ‘right in deferred community property.’”358 This right implies that 
after dissolving the marriage and deduction of debts, a spouse has a 
350. Id.
351. Id. at 8 (providing an analysis on Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Germany, Italy, Spain, 
and Croatia’s spousal equality).
352. Rešetar, supra note 278, at 6 (noting that in France, both spouses jointly administer 
the community of property in equal terms, and that “[t]he particularity of the French 
system is compensatory transfers (prestation compensatoire), a combination of matri-
monial property law and maintenance. In most cases, the court makes compensatory 
orders, compensating any disparity in the standard of living of the spouses. The pur-
pose of this order is to maintain the financially weaker party. The courts also consider 
the economic circumstances of the parties with the economically weaker spouse 
needs.”).
353. CONSTITUTION art. 45(3) (2010) (Kenya); see also Melby et al., supra note 339, at 
654.
354. See Odhiambo & Oduor, supra note 8, at 123.
355. Rešetar, supra note 278, at 17.
356. Maarit Jänterä et al., Property Relationship Between Spouses-Sweden, NATIONAL 
REPORT: SWEDEN 1, 2 (2008).
357. Id.
358. Id. at 11.
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“right to half of the value of both spouses’ marital property, meaning 
equal shares of the property.”359
In all Scandinavian legal systems, except that of Norway, the court 
may refrain from an equal division between the spouses for equitable 
reasons; for instance, in the case of a marriage of short duration.360 Un-
der Norway’s system, the court can exercise discretion and award the 
economically disadvantaged spouse a part of the reserved property (gifts, 
legacies, personal assets, and rights) to achieve fairer divorce out-
comes.361
C. Judicial Approach to Non-Monetary Contribution in England
In a similar jurisdiction to Kenya, the former colonial power Eng-
land, the courts have declared that it is unacceptable to place greater 
value on the contribution of a breadwinner than that of the homemak-
er.362 As part of the British Commonwealth, Kenya’s legal jurisdiction 
bears a striking resemblance to England.363 Kenya is part of the group of
countries previously colonized by England, and Kenya’s system of law 
borrowed heavily from England. It is commonly accepted that the 
breadwinner is viewed as the person who makes the monetary contribu-
tion while the homemaker is seen as the person who spends more time 
undertaking non-monetary work within the marital unit.364
In comparison to Kenya’s judicial approach on equality of spousal 
contribution, the House of Lords in White v. White (2001) and 
Mcafarlane v. Mcafarlane (2006) affirmed that financial and non-
financial contributions apply in equal measure.365 Section 25 of the 
English Matrimonial Causes Act enumerates factors governing the 
359. Id. at 2.
360. Magdelene de Jong & Walter Pintens, Default Matrimonial Property Regimes and the 
Principles of European Family Law—A European -South African Comparison (Part 1),
J. S. AFR. L. 363, 366–69 (2015).
361. Id. at 369.
362. Lambert v. Lambert [2003] EWCA (Civ) 1685 [38], [2003] Fam 103 (Eng.).
363. See Member Countries, COMMONWEALTH, http://thecommonwealth.org/member-
countries (last visited Feb. 2, 2019).
364. Parkinson, supra note 119, at 18–19.
365. White v. White [2000] UKHL 54, [2001] 1 AC 596 (Eng.); McFarlane v. McFar-
lane [2006] UKHL 24, [2006] 2 AC 618 (Eng.). Both cases affirm that in determin-
ing the parties’ contributions to the matrimonial estate, there should be no bias in fa-
vor of the wage-earner against non-economic contributions such as managing the 
domestic household or caregiving. In the cases, the judges acknowledged that this is a 
principle of universal application, applicable to all marriages.
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exercise of the court’s discretion with regard to spousal contribution.366
Coincidentally, the language of Section 25(2)(f) of the statute has 
similar language to Section 7 of Kenya’s MPA.367 Unlike Kenya’s MPA, 
Section 25 of the English Matrimonial Causes Act also provides other 
statutory factors for the courts to consider in dividing marital assets, like 
duration of marriage, custodial parent, and wasteful dispensation of 
assets.368 In considering the value of non-monetary contributions, the 
courts in England focus on the economic impact of the relinquished 
opportunities, because they reduce the earning potential of the 
homemaker spouse.369
VI. Proposed Law Reforms in Kenya to Account for 
Spousal Contributions
In Kenya, the courts have failed to justify why non-monetary and 
monetary contributions should not be accorded similar weight. I rec-
ommend that courts recognize the role of uncompensated domestic 
work to the economy and interpret the law to give effect to the constitu-
tional principle of spousal equality.
A. Application of Various Models in Kenya 
Models accounting for spousal contribution remain different 
around the world. In continental Europe, the Scandinavian Model of 
property division recognizes a modified dual breadwinner regime, 
wherein the marriage equalizes the value of indirect and direct contribu-
tions while correcting de facto inequality between spouses.370 Thus, using 
models of property division based on the equality of spouses and equali-
ty of spousal contribution, such as the Scandinavian Model, would lead 
to fair outcomes.371 The Scandinavian Model adopts a liberal approach 
366. The Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, c. 18 § 25(2) (Eng.), 
https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1973/18 (providing that the court shall look to 
“the contributions which each of the parties has made or is likely in the foreseeable 
future to make to the welfare of the family, including any contribution by looking af-
ter the home or caring for the family”).
367. Id.
368. The Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, c. 18, § 25 (Eng.), 
https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1973/18.
369. See What’s Fair, supra note 317, at 66; Parkinson, supra note 119, at 11.
370. Rešetar, supra note 278, at 4.
371. See id. at 16.
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to the judicial consequences of divorce and presupposes that women re-
ceive an equal share of the property after divorce.372 The Scandinavian 
model demonstrates that recognizing spousal equality in contribution 
does not diminish the court’s capacity to distribute marital property.373
Rather, the recognition of spousal equality provides a starting point for 
property division. The use of explicit statutory factors ensures that 
courts achieve a fair or just outcome in a long-term or short-term mar-
riage. For example, in the Scandinavian approach, contribution is one 
among the numerous factors courts consider in dividing marital assets.374
The case of P.N.N. v. Z.W.N. (2017) is instructive to show how 
application of the Scandinavian Model would have changed the out-
come. In that case, the court missed the mark when it stated that divi-
sion of marital property is not about distribution of property but is a
process of determining who among the spouses owns which property.375
Adopting the principle of equality in marriage under Article 45 of the 
Constitution can correct the existing issues identified by the court.376 In 
line with the modern approach to divorce law, the MPA did not alter 
the constitutional provision on spousal equality; rather, it sought to 
broaden the approach the courts should take in assessing claims to mari-
tal property.377 Under the principle of equal spousal contributions, 
spouses share an equitable claim to the marital estate.378 The system 
guarantees the homemaker compensation for the contributions under-
taken during the marriage and recognizes marriage as a joint venture.379
The English approach takes account of the economic impact of lost 
opportunities and appreciates women’s economic contribution to the 
family and home through non-monetary activities.380 In Kenya, the 
courts fail to consider the economic impact of the lost opportunities.381
Consequently, the approach undervalues non-monetary contributions 
while dividing marital assets and disadvantaging the women.382 In 
determining the economic impact of lost opportunities, the courts 




375. P.N.N. v. Z.W.N (2017), Civil Appeal No. 128 of 2014, e.K.L.R. (C.A.K.) (Kenya).
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377. The Matrimonial Property Act, No. 49 §2 (2013) (Kenya).
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spouse’s career advancement, spousal needs, and future earning 
capacity.383 The economic impact stems from role separation and 
specialization within the marital partnership.384 Kenyan women perform 
most of the duties that qualify as non-monetary contribution.385
The English approach and the Scandinavian Model both recognize 
the participation of women in the labor force and in household work 
using a modified dual breadwinner system. In Kenya, the courts have a 
duty to uphold equality of spouses and the exceptional behavior in 
homemaking contributions of either spouse. Adopting a modified dual 
breadwinner system would accomplish this.386 The system appreciates 
women’s economic contribution to the family and the support accorded 
to the household through non-monetary activities. The modified system 
recognizes the equality of spousal contribution and non-economic con-
tribution as family support.387 Spouses have an equal share of family as-
sets regardless of contribution or acquisition.388
Approaches from the United States, including the ALI Principles, 
are also instructive. Because of the unfair decisions on long-term mar-
riages in Kenya, a universal model approach, such as that adopted by the 
ALI Principles for long-term marriages, would allow courts to divide 
marital property without regard to the mode and time of acquisition.389
However, an adaptation of the ALI model could face significant chal-
lenges as a guide for law reform in Kenya because the ALI model focuses 
on alimony.390 In Kenya, parties litigate issues of marital property and 
alimony separately.391
In Kenya, the Court of Appeal in P.N.N. v. Z.W.N. (2017) faced a 
dilemma in interpreting the Constitution and the MPA with regard to 
short-term marriages.392 The ALI Principles recommend a formulaic 
substitute in determining both the amount and duration of such 
claims.393 In particular, the ALI Principles propose “compensation for 
loss of marital standard of living” for the long-term homemaker.394 The 
“ALI guidelines include a calculation to determine the amount of com-
383. Parkinson, supra note 119, at 47.
384. Id. at 12–14
385. Chen, supra note 1.
386. Rešetar, supra note 278, at 16–17.
387. Id.
388. Id.
389. See What’s Fair, supra note 317, at 61.
390. Westfall, supra note 87, at 920 n.10.
391. Id.
392. P.N.N. v. Z.W.N. (2017) Civil Appeal No. 128 of 2014, e.K.L.R. (C.A.K.) (Kenya).
393. See Westfall, supra note 87, at 933.
394. Id.
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pensation a spouse should receive for” foregoing earning capacity to be a 
homemaker.395 The same approach applies to a short-term marriage. De-
spite shortcomings, the ALI Principles propose factors useful in valuing 
the homemaker contribution. Courts in Kenya that grapple with the 
value of the homemaker contribution could borrow from the factors 
enumerated by the ALI principles.396 Courts in Kenya can also look to 
the AAML Guidelines, which propose additional factors, such as dura-
tion of marriage, age of parties, financial needs, and spousal contribu-
tion to assist in dividing marital assets and achieving fair divorce out-
comes.397
B. Next Steps for Kenya
In order to achieve desired results and cure the unfairness of broad 
judicial discretion in valuing non-monetary contribution, first, the MPA 
should include statutory factors to guide the courts’ decision-making. 
Second, in comparison with jurisdictions like the United States and the 
Scandinavian countries, the MPA provides a narrow definition of mat-
rimonial property.398 In order to remedy the existing injustices propagat-
ed by this limiting definition, Kenya should consider revising the MPA 
to include intangible assets as part of matrimonial property. Third,
Kenyan courts should consider Article 45(3) of the Constitution as the 
basis for spousal equality in determining the weight of economic and 
non-economic contributions of either spouse. Finally, Kenya should 
adopt social reforms to ease the burden of unpaid work on women.
First, the MPA should add additional factors for courts to consider 
in distribution of marital property on divorce. The MPA has omitted an 
important factor that relates to the lowering of human capital of 
homemakers in valuing spousal contribution. In deciding marital cases, 
the courts should consider the future financial circumstances of either 
spouse. As in Wendt v. Wendt, the rule is based on the future financial 
needs of the homemaker spouse.399 Family law scholars like Patrick 
Parkinson have argued that the homemaker contribution is not about 
the quality of contribution or who performed more housework; rather, 
395. Morris, supra note 5, at 93.
396. See Westfall, supra note 87, at 920.
397. Willick, supra note 333, at 197–98.
398. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 12; Kaddari & Freeman, supra note 173, at 
335.
399. See generally Wendt v. Wendt, 757 A2d 1225 (2000).
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the courts should recognize the division of roles in many marriages.400 In 
echoing the same point, the CEDAW Committee emphasized the need 
for state parties such as Kenya to recognize the contribution to marital 
property that development in the human capital provides.401
The CEDAW Committee stated that this support increases the 
value of the marital estate.402 As a rule, the courts need not get into the 
adjudication of who did more cleaning, cooking, or weeding, as it fo-
cuses more on relations other than finances.403 In Kenya, household ser-
vices may cost anywhere from three dollars per day to 130 dollars per
month; as such, it would be unconscionable for courts to equate years of 
emotional, psychological, and physical investment and support to a 
mere 130 dollars.404 If both parties participate full-time in the work-
force, then allocation of household responsibilities has no discernible 
economic consequences.405 Therefore, the court would base the home-
maker contribution on the development of human capital that contrib-
uted to the growth of the marital estate.
Additional factors that courts should consider include: the eco-
nomic impact of lost career opportunities; support to the other spouse’s 
career advancement; spousal needs, including future financial circum-
stances of both spouses; duration of marriage; age and health of the 
spouses; which spouse is the custodial parent; wasteful use of assets; and 
unfair transfer of property.
Second, Kenya should also revise the MPA to expand the definition 
of marital property to include intangible assets such as shareholding, 
trademarks, life insurance, and business goodwill. The modern model of 
partnership recognizes the equality of spousal contribution in property 
acquisition and division. However, in dividing marital property, the 
Kenyan courts have rejected the modern partnership approach. Post-
2010, the law made it explicit that courts should consider non-monetary 
contributions.406 In spite of this, courts are not giving the law its intend-
ed effect, and as discussed, results can be quite arbitrary and unpredicta-
400. See Parkinson, supra note 119, at 29, 37.
401. See General Recommendation No. 21, supra note 153, ¶ 32.
402. See id.
403. See Parkinson, supra note 119, at 31.
404. See generally KENYA MINISTRY OF LABOR, LEGAL NOTICE ON WAGE INCREASE
(2017), https://www.taxkenya.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Minimum-Wages-
Order-Kenya-2017.pdf.
405. Parkinson, supra note 119, at 11.
406. The Matrimonial Property Act, No. 49 § 2 (2013) (Kenya).
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ble.407 Moreover, because the MPA failed to include the CEDAW rec-
ommendation on giving equal value to monetary and non-monetary 
contribution and failed to expand the meaning of matrimonial property 
to include intangible assets,408 Kenya should take the needed steps to 
rectify the inequality and enable courts achieve fairness and equity in 
property division.409
Third, Kenya’s courts should give effect to the concept of spousal 
equality written into the Constitution. To do so, they should adopt the 
Scandinavian Model of property distribution. Across the world, the 
modern model of partnership recognizes the equality of spousal contri-
bution in property acquisition and division.410 Considering the Scandi-
navian model, and even the United States’ equitable approach, an equi-
table distribution of marital assets achieves fairer divorce outcomes 
compared to those outcomes in Kenya. 
Presently, the courts in Kenya struggle with the interpretation of 
Article 45 of the Constitution as it relates to Section 7 of the MPA. 
Gender remains the dominant and most important determinant of the 
division of housework.411 Family law practices continue to perpetuate 
the harsh reality of women’s economic disadvantage and vulnerability 
within both families and the labor market.412 It could be argued that, in 
rejecting the previously established principle of spousal equality, the 
courts appear to state that the MPA supersedes the Constitution. How-
ever, in enacting the MPA, the legislature meant to give effect to Article 
45, not to take away the property rights already gained.
The denial of the intent of Article 45 of the Constitution 
perpetuates an injustice and the existing de facto inequality between 
spouses. Denial of the true intent of the provision is a denial of women’s 
rights. Because of the constitutional guarantee of equality, the courts 
must begin analysis of property division by assuming each spouse is 
entitled to half of the marital property.
407. See F.S. v. E.Z.  (2016) Matrimonial Cause No. 16 of 2014, e.K.L.R. (H.C.K.) 
(Kenya); M.G.N.K. v. A.G.M. (2016) Civil Appeal No. 280 of 2012, e.K.L.R. 
(C.A.K.) (Kenya); M.A.A. v. A.R. (2018) Matrimonial Cause No. 1 of 2017, 
e.K.L.R. (H.C.K.) (Kenya).
408. Concluding Observations on Eighth Report, supra note 60, ¶ 45. The Committee 
noted that the requirement to prove contribution to marital property discriminates 
against women and recommended repeal of Section 7 of the Marital Property Act. Id.
409. Id.
410. Kelly, supra note 112, at 157.
411. See generally The Matrimonial Property Act, No. 49 § 2 (2013) (Kenya); 
CONSTITUTION art. 45 (2010) (Kenya).
412. Rešetar, supra note 291, at 17–18.
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The Scandinavian Model can provide a constitutional basis for 
treating the homemaker spouse and the wage-earner spouse as beginning 
on equal footing with regard to division of marital property. From this 
starting point, the court can then evaluate other criteria to reach the 
right outcome. Indeed, most courts in Kenya have acknowledged equali-
ty of spouses in all other aspects of marriage except in contribution. Due 
to the influence of patriarchal, traditional, and private values, courts 
have disregarded the equality of spousal contribution. As a long-term 
solution to the influence of patriarchy and traditional values, and in 
adopting the Scandinavian Model, I recommend training courts to be 
more aware of their gender bias in making judgments.
Fourth, Kenya should modify its economic and social policies to 
address the inequalities between paid work and unpaid work.413 In order 
to address the inequalities between paid and unpaid work, researcher 
economist Indira Hirway recommend recognizing, reorganizing, and 
redistributing (“the Triple R approach”) unpaid work.414 By adopting 
the Triple R approach, the Kenyan government can assimilate unpaid 
work into the mainstream economy.415 In effect, public programs will 
provide an equitable safety net for unpaid caregivers.416 For example, 
Kenya can consider a social welfare system that supports divorced and 
economically disadvantaged women to care for their dependents.417 In so 
doing, Kenya will ease the burden of unpaid work of women and ensure 
the moderation of post-divorce economic consequences on women.
Ultimately, it is essential to ensure that the statutory recognition of 
non-monetary contributions is not an illusory promise.418 Courts in 
Kenya have noted that each case is determined on its own circumstanc-
es.419 However, as demonstrated, there is a struggle within the courts to 
413. See Hirway, supra note 76, at 11.
414. Id. at 13–16 (“[t]his approach attempts to integrate unpaid work into the mainstream 
economy by reducing it and by reorganizing it between paid and unpaid work”).
415. Id. at 13–22.
416. Lisa Philipps, Helping Out in the Family Firm: The Legal Treatment of Unpaid Market 
Labor, 23 WIS. J.L. GENDER, & SOC’Y 65, 99 (2008).
417. Concluding Observations on Eighth Report, supra note 60; Philip N. Cohen, The 
Divorce Fairness Issue that Jeff and MacKenzie Bezos Don’t Have to Worry About, CNN
(Jan. 12, 2019), https://edition.cnn.com/2019/01/11/opinions/divorce-unfair-bezos-
opinion-cohen/index.html. In the United States, “[t]he poverty rate for divorced 
women living with at least one child in 2018 was 19%, more than twice the rate for 
divorced men living with one or more children.” Id. Cohen argues that divorce could 
be made less damaging to women through stronger social safety nets. Id.
418. See Judith I. Avner, Using the Connecticut Equal Rights Amendment at Divorce to Pro-
tect Homemakers’ Contributions to the Acquisition of Marital Property, 4 U.
BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 265, 269 (1983).
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shape a rule that will achieve wide public backing.420 In order to achieve 
judicial consistency and fairness in marital property division, the courts 
should shape standards that achieve predictable and consistent out-
comes.421 Because the courts have failed to equalize the weight of mone-
tary and non-monetary contribution through the constitutional guaran-
tee of spousal equality, they should look beyond their jurisdictions and 
take persuasive guidance through developments in divorce law across the 
world.
Conclusion
Since the enactment of the MPA, the courts show conflicting ap-
proaches on the interpretation of Section 7 as it relates to Article 45 of 
the Constitution. The courts have failed to provide a definitive ap-
proach on the weight of uncompensated domestic work as a form of 
spousal contribution. As it currently stands, the courts have failed to 
equalize the weight of non-monetary and monetary contributions be-
cause of apparent bias and the lack of further legislative direction. The 
approach offends Article 45 of the Constitution and international hu-
man rights standards on the weight of spousal contribution. In addition 
to leaving potential litigants in a muddled playing field, the approach 
alienates and disempowers women, leaving them to suffer severe post-
divorce economic consequences. In addition, the approach hinders 
Kenya’s strides towards gender equality.
As earlier discussed, the MPA fails to meet the CEDAW Commit-
tee standards in defining matrimonial property.422 The burden of unpaid 
work on Kenyan women demonstrates why the country should aim for 
an improved matrimonial property law by revising the MPA. 
The proposed directions on matrimonial property law reform will 
guide courts further in accounting for uncompensated domestic work 
during division of marital assets. Giving equal weight to monetary and 
non-monetary contributions is not only the right thing to do, but also 
the smart thing to do. This is one way of achieving the overriding 
objective of fairer divorce outcomes and advancing Kenya toward the 
ultimate goal of gender equality.
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422. See The Matrimonial Property Act, No. 49 § 6 (2013) (Kenya).

